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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                      
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
          Defendants Melba Quintero, Jose Gonzalez-Rivera, Maria 
Rodriguez, Santiago Gonzalez, Joaquin Mordago, and Jose Cruz 
appeal from judgments entered in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania after a jury trial in 
which they were all convicted of conspiracy to distribute in 
excess of five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 
846 (Count One).  In addition to the conspiracy count, each of 
the six defendants was convicted of other counts in the twenty-
eight count indictment. 
          The trial lasted twenty days during which the 
government presented evidence consisting of electronic 
surveillance, audio recordings, video recordings, documents 
seized from defendants at the time of their arrest, and testimony 
 
 
of numerous law enforcement witnesses and of an expert in 
interpreting drug jargon.  The government also presented the 
testimony of Cristobal Paz, one of the defendants' co-
conspirators, who had pled guilty and who testified as a 
cooperating witness for the prosecution. 
          In addition to the conspiracy count, the jury found 
Gonzalez-Rivera guilty of one count of engaging in a continuing 
criminal enterprise ("CCE") in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848 
(Count Two), two counts of possession with intent to distribute 
cocaine in violation of 21 § U.S.C. 841(a)(1) (Counts Five and 
Six), and one count of use of a communication facility to 
facilitate the conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) 
(Count Eight).  Rodriguez was convicted of one count of use of a 
communication facility to facilitate the conspiracy (Count 
Thirteen).  Gonzalez was convicted of two counts of distribution 
of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Counts Fourteen 
and Sixteen) and one count of use of a communication facility to 
facilitate the conspiracy (Count Twenty-One).  The jury also 
found that, pursuant to 21 § U.S.C. 853, Gonzalez must forfeit 
certain property to the United States (Count Twenty-Five).  
Quintero was convicted of three counts of use of a communication 
facility to facilitate the conspiracy (Counts Seventeen, 
Nineteen, and Twenty), one count of distribution of cocaine 
(Count Twenty-Two), and one count of possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine (Count Twenty-Three).  Mordago was convicted 
 
 
of one count of use of a communication facility to facilitate the 
conspiracy (Count Eighteen).  Cruz was convicted of one count of 
possession with intent to distribute cocaine (Count Five).1 
          On appeal, all of the defendants, except Cruz, 
challenge the district court's refusal to suppress certain 
telephone surveillance tapes which comprised part of the 
government's evidence.  Defendants assert that the tapes were not 
sealed immediately after the final authorization order expired, 
                     
1.  As stated, each defendant was convicted on Count One of 
conspiracy to distribute in excess of five kilograms of cocaine.  
Based on these convictions, the defendants received the following 
sentences.  Gonzalez-Rivera was sentenced to life imprisonment on 
each of Counts One, Two, Five, and Six; 48 months imprisonment on 
Count Eight to run concurrently with the life terms; and a $250 
special assessment.  Rodriguez was sentenced to 144 months 
imprisonment on Count One; 48 months imprisonment on Count 
Thirteen to run concurrently with the earlier count; five years 
supervised release; and a $100 special assessment.  Gonzalez was 
sentenced to 240 months imprisonment on Counts One, Fourteen, and 
Sixteen; 48 months imprisonment on Count Twenty-One to run 
concurrently with the earlier counts; five years supervised 
release; $21,000 in restitution; $5,000 fine; and a $200 special 
assessment.  Quintero was sentenced to 235 months imprisonment on 
Counts One, Twenty-Two, and Twenty-Three; 48 months imprisonment 
on Counts Seventeen, Nineteen, and Twenty to run concurrently 
with the earlier counts; five years supervised release; and a 
$300 special assessment.  According to Quintero's Presentence 
Report, Quintero was found not guilty on Count Twenty-Eight and 
discharged as to that forfeiture count.  Our reading of the trial 
transcript indicates that the jury found that Quintero must 
forfeit $2,000 resulting from money received as alleged in overt 
act 36 of Count One, but not guilty as to $3,000 resulting from 
money received as alleged in overt act 37 of Count One.  Mordago 
was sentenced to 264 months imprisonment on Count One; 48 months 
imprisonment on Count Eighteen to run concurrently with the 
earlier count; five years supervised release; and a $100 special 
assessment.  Cruz was sentenced to 186 months imprisonment on 
Counts One and Five to run concurrently; five years supervised 
release; and a $100 special assessment. 
 
 
as required by statute, and that the government failed to offer a 
satisfactory explanation for the delay in sealing.  For the 
reasons which we will more fully develop below, we conclude that 
certain of the surveillance tapes should have been suppressed.  
The government concedes that those convictions arising directly 
from the tapes cannot stand if the tapes are suppressed.  We 
agree and will reverse those convictions.  As for the remaining 
convictions, we will examine them under a harmless error standard 
to determine whether they must also be reversed.2 
 I. 
          On February 7, 1992, a grand jury in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania returned a twenty-eight count indictment 
charging twelve individuals, including the six defendants here, 
                     
2.  In addition to the counts affected by the telephone 
surveillance tapes, and the harmless error analysis we will apply 
to those counts, defendants also challenge numerous individual 
aspects of their convictions and sentences.  Gonzalez-Rivera 
asserts that his conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine 
should be dismissed as a lesser included offense and challenges 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support (1) his conviction of 
engaging in a CCE and (2) the district court's conclusion that he 
was involved in the distribution of in excess of 150 kilograms of 
cocaine.  Rodriguez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support her conviction of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and 
the district court's refusal to allow defendant's counsel to 
cross-examine Quintero.  Gonzalez asserts that the district court 
erred in failing to grant a mistrial sua sponte and to sever his 
trial from Mordago's trial.  Gonzalez also challenges his 
conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine as well as the 
district court's imposition of restitution and a fine.  Cruz 
challenges the district court's refusal to suppress certain 
physical evidence obtained during a search of a car driven by the 
defendant.  We have carefully reviewed these grounds for appeal 
and find them to be without merit. 
 
 
with a conspiracy to distribute cocaine in the Philadelphia 
region.  The indictment resulted from an extensive undercover 
investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
("FBI") and other law enforcement personnel. 
          After receiving information from a cooperating witness 
that drug dealers in the Philadelphia area needed vehicles with 
concealed compartments, the FBI established an undercover 
operation known as MRK Services, Inc. ("MRK").  MRK rented "load 
cars"--cars which had secret compartments that could conceal 
large quantities of drugs or currency.  MRK also leased out 
mobile cellular telephones.  Hidden video and audio devices had 
been installed in the MRK offices to record the transactions that 
took place there.  In addition, monitoring devices had been 
placed in the load cars to facilitate surveillance.  Two 
undercover officers, Carlos Tapia ("agent Tapia") and Arsenio 
Gonzalez ("agent Gonzalez") posed as employees of MRK and in that 
capacity had dealings with several of the defendants. 
          As part of the investigation, the government conducted 
ninety days of electronic surveillance of Paz's cellular 
telephone, from August 1, 1991, through October 29, 1991.  There 
were three one-month authorizations and three judicial sealings.  
The first authorization expired on August 30, 1991 ("August 
tapes").  The August tapes were sealed eleven days later, on 
September 10, 1991, by District Court Judge James J. Giles.  The 
first extension of the surveillance was authorized for thirty 
 
 
days and expired on September 29, 1991 ("September tapes").  The 
September tapes were sealed five days later, on October 5, 1991, 
by District Court Judge James McGirr Kelly, who was serving as 
Emergency Judge.  The second, and final, extension of the 
surveillance was authorized for thirty days and expired on 
October 29, 1991 ("October tapes").  The October tapes were 
sealed twenty days later, on November 18, 1991, by Judge Giles.    
 During this period, Paz used his cellular phone to 
discuss his cocaine business with many of the individuals named 
in the indictment.  At trial, the government offered into 
evidence sixty tape recordings and four video recordings 
involving the defendants.  A large majority of the taped 
conversations were of telephone calls on Paz's cellular phone.  
The remaining calls were recorded as incoming calls to MRK.  Each 
of the defendants, except Cruz, was recorded talking with Paz on 
a number of occasions.  Before turning to the question of whether 
the government failed to seal the tapes in a manner consistent 
with the law, an overview of the evidence presented at trial is 
important to understanding the scope of the enterprise.  
          In November 1990, an informant serving a term of 
imprisonment with Cristobal Paz informed the FBI that Paz, who 
intended to re-enter the drug trade on release from prison, 
needed a "ghost job" in order to satisfy the terms of his parole.  
The FBI instructed the informant to give Paz the MRK telephone 
number.  After his release, Paz called MRK and spoke to agent 
 
 
Tapia about a ghost job.  Paz was informed that he could work as 
a ghost employee with MRK if he agreed to supply MRK with funds 
up front, which MRK would then use to pay Paz.  Paz did not 
comply with this condition and was not given a ghost job.   
          On his release from prison, Paz sought to reestablish 
himself in the Philadelphia area as a major cocaine supplier.  He 
claims to have received large quantities of cocaine from 
Gonzalez-Rivera in New York and from Oscar Fuentes in Florida.  
Paz began to sell cocaine to agent Gonzalez.  On May 7, 1991, 
three individuals, working for Paz, delivered one kilogram of 
cocaine to MRK in exchange for $21,000.  After receiving the 
cocaine, agent Gonzalez called Paz to confirm that it had 
arrived.  Paz testified that this cocaine was supplied by Fuentes 
and delivered to Philadelphia by Santiago Gonzalez.  According to 
Paz, after he took $1,000 on the deal, he paid Gonzalez the 
remaining $20,000 for the cocaine.  On cross-examination, Paz 
acknowledged that he had earlier told the FBI that this cocaine 
was supplied by Gonzalez-Rivera. 
          Paz testified that, although he was suspicious that 
agent Gonzalez was working undercover, this first sale helped to 
convince him that MRK was not an undercover police operation.  
Three weeks after the first cocaine sale, Paz leased two cellular 
phones and one digital telephone pager from MRK.  One of the 
telephones was for his own use, while the other was for a 
 
 
codefendant.  It was Paz's cellular phone that was later 
wiretapped. 
          In June 1991, Paz and Jose Rosario travelled to New 
York to receive a shipment of cocaine from Gonzalez-Rivera.  Paz 
returned to Philadelphia before receiving the cocaine but 
testified that Gonzalez-Rivera called to tell him that the 
cocaine had arrived.  Cruz and Rosario left New York with the 
cocaine to deliver it to Paz in Philadelphia.  They were stopped 
by the police for speeding on the New Jersey turnpike.  Because 
of their suspicious behavior, they were detained and their car 
was towed to the police barracks.  A police dog reacted 
positively to the presence of cocaine in the trunk of the car.  
The New Jersey police obtained a warrant to search a suitcase in 
the trunk and discovered fifteen kilograms of cocaine in it. 
          Paz testified that after the seizure of this cocaine 
Gonzalez-Rivera contacted his boss in the drug network, Guillermo 
(a/k/a "Memo"), in Medellin, Colombia.  According to Paz, 
Gonzalez-Rivera received his cocaine from Guillermo and Guillermo 
worked for Pablo Escobar.  
          On June 27, 1991, the day after the fifteen kilogram 
shipment of cocaine was seized, Paz rented a load car from MRK.  
Agent Gonzalez testified that, when Paz returned the car on July 
1, he stated that he had made two trips to New York, carrying 
forty-six kilograms on each trip and that he had transported a 
total of 145 kilograms of cocaine while he had the car.  In 
 
 
addition, Paz said that he had used the car to transport a large 
amount of cash to Baltimore.  After Paz left MRK, the agents 
inspected the car and found white powder in the hidden 
compartments.  The powder later tested positive for cocaine.   
          Two days later, on July 3, Paz rented a load car and 
drove it to New York.  When Paz returned the car a little more 
than a week later, the agents discovered two packages of coffee 
in the secret compartment.  An FBI agent testified that coffee is 
often used by drug traffickers to mask the smell of drugs from 
trained drug-sniffing dogs. 
          On July 15, Paz rented the same load car from MRK.  He 
drove to Gonzalez-Rivera's residence in the Bronx, New York.  Paz 
testified that he met Gonzalez-Rivera to take delivery of twenty-
six kilograms of cocaine.  New York City detectives set up 
surveillance at Gonzalez-Rivera's residence and at the residences 
of co-defendants Diego Jesus Ortega ("Ortega") and Ortega's 
nephew, Diego Mauricio Lopez-Ortega ("Lopez-Ortega").  Paz met 
Gonzalez-Rivera in Manhattan and drove to Gonzalez-Rivera's 
residence in the Bronx.  On arriving at his residence, Gonzalez-
Rivera removed a gym bag from the car.  One hour later, an 
unidentified individual exited Gonzalez-Rivera's residence with 
two gym bags and placed them in the car that Paz had rented from 
MRK.  Later that day, Ortega left Gonzalez-Rivera's residence 
carrying a gym bag which he took to Lopez-Ortega's residence in 
Queens.  Police later obtained permission from Lopez-Ortega to 
 
 
search his apartment; they found six kilograms of cocaine in a 
gym bag.  Paz testified that the cocaine he received from 
Gonzalez-Rivera was brought to Philadelphia for distribution.  
Paz further testified that the cocaine seized from Lopez-Ortega 
had been rejected by Paz when Gonzalez-Rivera offered it to him.  
Upon Paz's return of the load car to MRK, agents discovered 
coffee grounds scattered throughout the secret compartment area. 
          On September 13, Paz and Santiago Gonzalez met with 
agent Gonzalez at MRK to sell him one kilogram of cocaine.  Agent 
Gonzalez indicated that he would like to see the cocaine.  
Santiago Gonzalez told Paz that "it's under your seat" in the car 
that they had driven to MRK.  Paz retrieved the cocaine from the 
car and was paid $21,000 by agent Gonzalez.  Paz took $1,000 to 
pay for his use of the cellular phone and handed the remaining 
$20,000 to Santiago Gonzalez.  Agent Gonzalez testified that 
Santiago Gonzalez held onto the money throughout the remainder of 
the meeting.  Paz testified that this kilogram was part of a 
twenty kilogram delivery that Santiago Gonzalez had brought from 
Florida. 
          On October 11, Paz gave five kilograms of cocaine on 
consignment to agent Gonzalez at MRK ("the October 11 cocaine").  
Agent Gonzalez met Paz at a Sunoco gas station near MRK prior to 
the sale.  According to agent Gonzalez, an unidentified female 
was in the front seat of Paz's car and Santiago Gonzalez was in 
the back seat.  After meeting at the Sunoco Station, Paz and 
 
 
agent Gonzalez proceeded to MRK in separate cars.  Paz entered 
MRK and delivered the five kilograms of cocaine.  After the 
transaction, agent Gonzalez and Paz walked back outside.  Agent 
Gonzalez noted that the unidentified woman and Santiago Gonzalez 
had remained in Paz's car.  Paz testified that the October 11 
cocaine was part of a delivery that Santiago Gonzalez made from 
Florida. 
          In a telephone call taped by MRK on October 16, Paz and 
Santiago Gonzalez asked to be paid for the October 11 cocaine.  
Agent Tapia testified that the FBI wanted to delay payment 
because they were planning to arrest Paz in the near future.  The 
FBI arranged a meeting with Paz for the following day.  Just 
moments before Paz was to meet with agent Tapia, the FBI staged a 
ruse in which the purported pay-off was seized from agent 
Gonzalez by officers in a marked police car.  The seizure was 
staged so that Paz witnessed the event in an effort to convince 
him that agent Tapia had planned to make the pay-off.   
          On October 31, Paz brought three additional kilograms 
of cocaine to MRK.  Agent Gonzalez was instructed by the FBI to 
accept two of the three kilograms of cocaine from Paz but to 
refuse the third.  Shortly after leaving MRK, Paz was arrested 
with the remaining kilogram of cocaine in his possession.   
          Paz testified that he received two and one-half 
kilograms of this cocaine from Quintero and codefendant Elsa Cruz 
during a trip to New York and that the remainder was left over 
 
 
from cocaine supplied to him by Santiago Gonzalez.  He said that 
the cocaine he received from Quintero and Cruz was "wet" and he 
needed to dry it before selling it to MRK.  Paz testified that 
Mordago helped him by drying the cocaine with acetone and that, 
during the October 31 transaction, he called Mordago to complain 
about the quality of the cocaine. 
          During the week following Paz's arrest, Santiago 
Gonzalez and agent Tapia talked on the MRK telephone about paying 
for the October 11 cocaine.  On November 8, 1991, Santiago 
Gonzalez was arrested in the parking lot of a Comfort Inn, where 
he had arranged to meet agent Tapia to receive the $97,500 which 
was owed for the October 11 cocaine.  Less than an hour later, 
Mordago was arrested in a room at the Comfort Inn, registered in 
Santiago Gonzalez's name.  On January 16, 1992, agents arrested 
Gonzalez-Rivera and Rodriguez outside the residence in the Bronx 
where they lived together.  At the time of their arrest, agents 
seized papers which contained the telephone and beeper numbers 
for several of the defendants named in the indictment. 
 II. 
          The central question in this appeal is whether the 
district court erred in denying defendants' motions to suppress 
the wiretaps.  The government concedes that the October tapes 
"were not sealed as soon as administratively practical."  In view 
of this concession, we must decide whether the October tapes 
should have been suppressed because the government failed to 
 
 
supply a satisfactory explanation for the sealing delay.  On this 
question, our review is plenary.  United States v. Carson, 969 
F.2d 1480, 1487 (3d Cir. 1992) ("We exercise plenary review over 
the legal issues relating to the sealing . . . of the tapes."). 
 III. 
 A. 
          Each of the five defendants, contesting the admission 
of the wiretap tapes, presented individual briefs to the court.  
Quintero asserts that all of the tapes must be suppressed.  
Gonzalez-Rivera and Mordago challenge the August and October 
tapes, while Rodriguez and Santiago Gonzalez limit their 
challenge to the October tapes.  For the reasons stated below, we 
conclude that only the October tapes must be suppressed. 
          In obtaining authorization for tapping into Paz's 
cellular phone, the government followed the procedures for 
interception contained in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et 
seq.  Defendants do not challenge the initial authorization or 
the two extensions.  The only challenge to the tapes is based on 
the assertion that the government failed to comply with § 
2518(8)(a) which provides, in part, that: 
 The recording of the contents of any wire, 
oral, or electronic communication under this 
subsection shall be done in such a way as 
will protect the recording from editing or 
other alterations.  Immediately upon the 
expiration of the period of the order, or 
extensions thereof, such recordings shall be 
made available to the judge issuing such 
order and sealed under his directions. . . . 
 
 
The presence of the seal provided for by this 
subsection, or a satisfactory explanation for 
the absence thereof, shall be a prerequisite 
for the use or disclosure of the contents of 
any wire, oral, or electronic communication 
or evidence derived therefrom under 
subsection (3) of section 2517.3 
(emphasis added). 
          In United States v. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. 257, 260 
(1990), the Supreme Court noted that § 2518(8)(a) contains "an 
explicit exclusionary remedy for noncompliance with the sealing 
requirement."  The Supreme Court determined that, pursuant to § 
2518(8)(a), a seal had to be "obtained immediately upon 
expiration of the underlying surveillance order."  Id. at 263 
(emphasis added).  In the absence of a timely sealing, the Court 
interpreted the statute to require that the government supply a 
satisfactory explanation for its failure to comply with the 
statute.  Id.  "[T]he 'satisfactory explanation' language in § 
2518(8)(a) must be understood to require that the Government 
explain not only why a delay occurred but also why it is 
                     
3.  18 U.S.C. § 2517(3) provides: 
 
 Any person who has received, by any means 
authorized by this chapter, any information 
concerning a wire, oral, or electronic 
communication, or evidence derived therefrom 
intercepted in accordance with the provisions 
of this chapter may disclose the contents of 
that communication or such derivative 
evidence while giving testimony under oath or 
affirmation in any proceeding held under the 
authority of the United States or of any 
State or political subdivision thereof. 
 
 
excusable."  Id. at 265.  The Court held that the explanation 
offered by the government for the delay must be the explanation 
relied upon by the government at the suppression hearing and not 
an excuse presented by the government for the first time on 
appellate review.  Id. at 267.   
          In Ojeda Rios, a series of court orders authorized 
electronic surveillance of the defendant in three different 
locations for three different time periods.  The government 
waited until the end of the entire investigation to seal the 
tapes.  The underlying question was whether the government had 
been obliged to seal the tapes from each location when that stage 
of the surveillance had terminated or whether tapings at 
different locations for different periods of time could be 
considered to be extensions of the original order.  The 
government asserted that its reason for the delay in sealing the 
tapes was the prosecutor's misunderstanding of the statutory term 
"extension."  Specifically, the government attorney believed that 
he was not required to seal any tapes until all the taping had 
been completed.   
          The Supreme Court held that the excuse advanced by the 
government was "objectively reasonable" at the time the 
government's decision was made, given earlier Second Circuit 
decisions interpreting the meaning of "extension" and its 
relationship to the sealing requirement.  The Court held that, if 
the government could show that the prosecutor's misunderstanding 
 
 
of the law was the excuse given by the government at the 
suppression hearing, such an "objectively reasonable" 
understanding of the law would be a "satisfactory explanation" 
for the government's delay in sealing the tapes.  495 U.S. at 
266. 
          Since Ojeda Rios, we have had two cases which required 
us to evaluate whether the government's delay in sealing tapes 
could be excused based on a "satisfactory explanation" provided 
by the government.  See United States v. Vastola, 989 F.2d 1318 
(3d Cir. 1993) (Vastola III);4 United States v. Carson, 969 F.2d 
1480 (3d Cir. 1992).  In Carson, we held that: 
 there are two kinds of justifiable government 
delays under the statutory scheme.  First, 
there are the relatively short delays 
necessitated by the process required to 
comply with the provisions of the Act. . . . 
Second, there are sometimes longer delays 
attributable to non-administrative, 
objectively reasonable causes like 
understandable mistakes of law and 
interference from unexpected, extrinsic 
events beyond the government's control. 
969 F.2d at 1488.5  We also stated in Carson that a "satisfactory 
explanation is usually based on a mistaken view of the law on 
                     
4.  In the present dispute, the government does not rely on a 
mistaken view of the law to explain why it delayed sealing the 
tapes.  Given that the focus of our decision in Vastola III was 
on whether the prosecutor's mistaken view of the law was 
objectively reasonable, we need not discuss that case in detail. 
5.  It is important to emphasize that this first type of delay 
concerns the short delays related directly to readying the tapes 
for sealing.  In Carson, we noted that "a local United States 
Attorney can obtain a sealing order simply by presenting the 
appropriate papers and tapes to the supervising judge.  Other 
 
 
what triggers sealing, but on occasion it can be supplied by an 
extraneous unforeseen emergent situation."  969 F.2d at 1487 
(citing Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. at 266 and United States v. Massino, 
784 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
          In Carson, we held that the government offered a 
satisfactory explanation for the delay in sealing certain tapes 
based on the prosecutor's mistaken view of the statute's sealing 
requirements.  969 F.2d at 1493.  However, with regard to a 
second set of tapes, we rejected the explanation for the delay as 
unsatisfactory.  The thirty-four day delay in sealing these tapes 
was caused by the government's sending them from New Jersey to 
Washington, D.C., to enhance their audibility.  Id. at 1497.  
Finding that this delay was caused by neither a mistaken view of 
the statute's requirements nor by an extraneous unforeseen 
emergent situation, we held that the second set of tapes must be 
suppressed. 
 B. 
          With this background, we now turn to the present 
dispute.  As a preliminary matter, we address the assertion put 
forth by Quintero and Gonzalez-Rivera that the August tapes 
should be suppressed because they were not sealed until the 
eleventh day after the initial wiretap authorization expired on 
August 30, 1991.  In Carson, we held that the government's 
(..continued) 
than gathering the tapes, putting them in boxes and taking the 
tapes to the supervising judge, the record discloses no other 
necessary steps to sealing."  969 F.2d at 1489. 
 
 
obligation to seal tapes under § 2518(8)(a) does not arise until 
the termination of the final extension of the order.  969 F.2d at 
1487 (language in § 2518(8)(a) which states that tapes must be 
sealed "immediately upon the expiration of the period of the 
order, or extensions thereof" represents "a Congressional 
determination that tapes secured under one order need not be 
sealed while surveillance is being conducted under a related 
order that may be considered an 'extension.'").  We have 
determined that a court's authorization to extend a wiretap 
beyond the initial authorization is generally limited to taps 
involving the same location, United States v. Vastola, 915 F.2d 
865, 874 (3d Cir. 1990) (Vastola II), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1120 
(1991).6     
          The extensions authorized here were clearly a 
continuation of the initial authorization to tap Paz's cellular 
phone.  None of the defendants have asserted that the first or 
second extension constituted anything other than a continuation 
of the initial authorization.  Consequently, the August tapes did 
not have to be sealed until the termination of the entire wiretap 
operation on October 29, 1991.  Given the fact that the August 
tapes were sealed on September 10, 1991, long before the wiretap 
terminated on October 29, 1991, the district court properly 
admitted the August tapes.  This same result applies to the 
                     
6.  Under the facts of the present case, we now perforce expand 
that interpretation of "extension" to include taps involving a 
designated cellular telephone. 
 
 
September tapes, which were sealed on October 4, 1991, again long 
before October 29, 1991.  Our focus, therefore, is on the October 
tapes. 
          The government concedes that it failed to seal the 
October tapes immediately:  "Regarding the October tapes, the 
government concedes that these tapes were not sealed as soon as 
administratively practical under Carson and Vastola III.  This 
Court must then determine if the October tapes are nonetheless 
admissible because the delay was 'objectively reasonable.'"   
          In order to assess whether the government has supplied 
a satisfactory explanation for the delay in sealing the October 
tapes, we are required under Ojeda Rios to examine the reasons 
supplied by the government to the district court.  In addition, 
we held in Vastola III that the government "must prove the actual 
reason for the sealing delay rather than an excuse for some 
ulterior purpose or administrative bungle." 989 F.2d at 1323.  
See also Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. at 267 ("a 'satisfactory 
explanation' within the meaning of [the statute] cannot merely be 
a reasonable excuse for the delay; it must also reflect the 
actual reason for the delay.") (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined 
by Blackmun, J.).  
          On the first day of the trial, defendants moved to 
suppress the tapes based on the government's failure to comply 
with the statute's sealing requirement.  At the hearing on the 
motion, FBI agent Michael McGowan, who headed the investigation,  
 
 
testified that he believed "part of the delay" in sealing was 
because at the end of the October authorization period both of 
the Assistant United States Attorneys ("AUSA"s) working on the 
case "were involved in separate trials."  Hearing at 57.  When 
asked on cross-examination what was the other reason for the 
delay, McGowan testified that "I don't know what the Judge's 
appointment was when he told the U.S. Attorney to appear.  We 
don't contact the Judge.  We go through the U.S. Attorney's 
office."  Id.  Later in the hearing, AUSA Carlos Suddath, who was 
one of the two prosecutors working on the case, asserted that 
McGowan's testimony supported the contention that the government 
had provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay.  He noted 
that both he and the other AUSA working on the case, Thomas 
Martir, were occupied with other trials.  Suddath agreed with the 
district court that his trial was on the same floor as Judge 
Giles's chambers but explained the delay in sealing by stating 
that "we also must fit in with the Judge's schedule."  Id. at 70. 
          Because the issue of suppressing the tapes was raised 
for the first time that day, the district court allowed the 
prosecution time to file a supplemental brief, opposing the 
defendants' motion to suppress.  The reasons, given by the 
government in its brief, mirrored those given at the initial 
hearing on the motion.  The government noted that from October 15 
to November 15, 1991, AUSA Suddath was on trial before Judge 
Kelly in a major criminal trial.  During the "first two weeks" of 
 
 
November 1991 AUSA Martir was involved in "substantial pretrial 
preparation in a complex defense procurement fraud case" which 
was scheduled to begin on December 3, 1991.  The government 
stated that this involved a substantial amount of time outside 
the office as Martir interviewed approximately twenty potential 
witnesses.  In addition, Martir was responsible for two 
sentencing hearings during the first week in November, a 
detention hearing during the second week in November, and the 
preparation of the complaints and arrest warrants for Santiago 
Gonzalez and Mordago.  The government also noted that Judge Giles 
was unavailable between September 30 and November 4, 1991, 
because he was sitting by designation in the Virgin Islands.            
Although finding the delay in sealing the October tapes "somewhat 
more troublesome" than the delays associated with the August and 
September tapes, the district court held the October tapes 
admissible.  Dist. Ct. Order at 4.  After subtracting the four 
days in which Judge Giles was unavailable, four weekend days, and 
the Veteran's Day holiday, the district court concluded that the 
delay in sealing the October tapes amounted to twelve working 
days.7  The district court held that "since the delay here falls 
                     
7.  In fact, the time period between October 29 and November 18, 
1991, included three weekends which, using the district court's 
methods, would amount to a delay of ten working days.  We are 
aware that we discounted weekend days in Carson in the situation 
of a taping order expiring on a Wednesday and tapes being sealed 
the next Monday and of an order expiring on a Thursday and the 
tapes being sealed the next Wednesday.  We held there that the 
tapes were sealed immediately.  989 F.2d at 1498.  However, 
eliminating the days of one intervening weekend is very different 
from eliminating the days of multiple intervening weekends.  We 
 
 
within the ambit of the rough rule of thumb suggested in Carson, 
the tapes are admissible."  Id. at 7. 
          We interpret the district court's order to hold that 
the October tapes had been sealed "immediately" under the 
statute.  Thus, the district court did not address the question 
of whether there was a satisfactory explanation for the 
government's delay in sealing the tapes.8  However, because the 
government concedes that the October tapes were not sealed 
immediately, a conclusion with which we agree, the question now 
turns to whether the government has offered a satisfactory 
excuse.  Because this is a question of law subject to plenary 
review, and the record before us is complete, we are in a 
position to decide it.           
 C. 
          The primary reason offered by the government for the 
delay in sealing the October tapes is the workload of the AUSAs 
responsible for prosecuting the case.  In support of its 
assertion that a prosector's workload can serve as a satisfactory 
(..continued) 
do not address here the propriety of subtracting the days of 
multiple intervening weekends in determining the length of the 
delay. 
8.  In making its finding, the district court did hold that it 
was permissible to include the days Judge Giles was unavailable.  
The district court made no substantive findings, however, with 
regard to the work schedules of the two AUSAs prosecuting the 
case.  The court made passing reference to the fact that the 
October tapes were sealed "the first working day after AUSA 
Suddath completed a month-long trial."  Dist. Ct. Order at 4.  No 
mention was made of AUSA Martir. 
 
 
excuse, the government points to language in Carson, 969 F.2d at 
1498, and decisions from several other courts of appeal.  See 
United States v. Pedroni, 958 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1992) (fourteen 
day delay permitted); United States v. Rodriguez, 786 F.2d 472 
(2d Cir. 1986) (same); United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633 (2d 
Cir. 1977) (7 day delay permitted), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903 
(1978).9 
          A review of these cases reveals that there are 
substantial differences between them and the present dispute.  
Moreover, the only language we find in Carson which suggests 
support for the proposition asserted by the government that 
"[t]his Court . . . has recognized that personnel shortages, 
including the trial schedule and work responsibilities of a 
prosecutor, may be a 'satisfactory explanation'" is the 
statement: 
           We recognize that there may be 
limited special circumstances apart from the 
administrative practicalities of obtaining a 
sealing order that would justify some delay. 
                     
9.  The government's brief also directs us to our opinion in 
Vastola III, 989 F.2d at 1327-28 n.1 (view of Nygaard, J.) in 
support of the government's assertion that "personnel shortages, 
including the trial schedule and work responsibilities of a 
prosecutor, may be a 'satisfactory explanation' for a sealing 
delay."  The dispute in Vastola III involved the question, inter 
alia, of whether the government's mistaken view of the law was an 
objectively reasonable one at the time.  The dispute did not 
involve a question of whether administrative difficulties or 
attorney caseload might be a satisfactory explanation for a delay 
in sealing tapes.  We regard the language in footnote 1 
concerning an attorney's caseload as dictum, given that such 
language was not relevant to our decision in Vastola III. 
 
 
969 F.2d at 1498.  However, in Carson we then went on to discuss 
United States v. Massino and the adequacy of an excuse if the 
need for it was brought about by "unusual and unforeseeable" 
circumstances -- not by normal, albeit heavy, work schedules. 
          In Massino, the defendants moved to suppress 
surveillance tapes which the government sealed after a delay of 
fifteen days.  The government claimed that the delay was caused 
by the need to divert resources for "an immediate, sensitive and 
comprehensive investigation into a 'leak' of information" 
concerning the electronic surveillance of the defendants.  784 
F.2d at 154 n.2.  The government, fearful that the leak would 
jeopardize its ongoing investigation and expose confidential 
informants to danger, devoted all its resources to finding the 
leak. 
          While the court of appeals in Massino expressed concern 
about the length of delay, it ultimately held that the tapes 
should not be suppressed.  Id. at 158.  The court based its 
decision, in part, on the "lack of foreseeability that a large 
investigation would be needed" and that the leak represented an 
"urgent matter."  Id.  Massino then does represent a "limited 
special circumstance" in which a delay attributable to events 
unrelated to the sealing of the tapes is found to be a 
satisfactory explanation. 
          In Carson, we noted that "on occasion [a satisfactory 
explanation] can be supplied by an extraneous unforeseen emergent 
 
 
situation."  969 F.2d at 1487 (citing Massino, 784 F.2d at 157).  
However, we held that the facts presented in Carson did not 
constitute a satisfactory explanation.  The need to enhance the 
audibility of the tapes was "readily foreseeable and could just 
as readily become routine." 969 F.2d at 1498.  We distinguished 
Massino, where there was "an unexpected, urgent need for 
investigation of a damaging leak.  Such a situation is unusual 
and unforeseeable."  Id.           
          We find the excuse offered by the government in the 
present case closer to the excuse in Carson than to that in 
Massino.  AUSA Suddath's trial was foreseeable.  In fact, he had 
been working on the same trial for two weeks prior to the 
termination of the surveillance operation.  Similarly, there was 
nothing in AUSA Martir's caseload that was unusual.  The 
government asserts that Martir's caseload increased unexpectedly 
when Santiago Gonzalez and Mordago were arrested on November 8, 
1991.  This increase is more consistent with the expected flow of 
cases into the United States Attorney's office than it is with 
the type of emergency described in Massino.  In addition, the 
government acknowledged during oral argument that it could have 
assigned any one of the many AUSAs in the Eastern District to 
process the sealing of the tapes before Judge Giles.  The 
government also conceded that the sealing was a "relatively 
simple procedure under the facts here."  In response to a 
 
 
question concerning the mechanics of a sealing, the government 
responded: 
 
 They are very limited, your Honor.  My 
estimate to the court is that in terms of the 
total time for example for that to be 
accomplished in front of the district court 
judge, we're not talking about more than 
fifteen minutes.  It is simply a matter of 
our assembling the tapes, putting them into 
boxes, taking them over to the courthouse, 
presenting them to the judge with a sealing 
order.  The tapes are physically sealed in 
front of the judge.  He initials the corners 
of the parcel, the box in which they are 
sealed to make sure that it can't be opened 
without its being noticed.  We then take them 
down to the clerk's office where they are 
given to a designated clerk and I believe 
kept in the district court clerk's safe. 
          The other cases cited by the government in support of 
its position are also distinguishable.  The government cites 
Rodriguez for the proposition that a fourteen day delay was 
permitted when the supervising attorney was preoccupied with 
another trial.  A closer reading of Rodriguez reveals that this 
excuse was but one of many factors relied upon by the court in 
vacating the district court's suppression order.  The court of 
appeals credited the government's explanation that the "bulk of 
the delay was caused in part" by the prosecutor's mistaken belief 
that a comprehensive report had to be filed at the time the tapes 
were sealed.  786 F.2d at 478.  While the prosecutor's workload 
in Rodriguez was a factor in finding time to prepare the report 
she mistakenly believed was needed, the primary rationale for the 
 
 
delay was the belief that a comprehensive report was needed in 
the first place, an excuse which the government does not claim is 
applicable here. 
          The government cites Scafidi for the proposition that a 
seven day delay was permissible when the prosecutor was 
preoccupied with an upcoming trial.  While this was the only 
reason provided for the delay, the court held that the government 
"presented a satisfactory explanation for this short delay." 
Scafidi, 564 F.2d at 641 (emphasis added).  As we noted in 
Carson:  "The length of a sealing delay is a relevant factor in 
considering whether an explanation is satisfactory,"  969 F.2d at 
1498 (citing United States v. McGrath, 622 F.2d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 
1980)).  We are not faced with a seven day delay in the present 
case.  We do not, therefore, need to determine if such a delay 
would be acceptable in this circuit. 
          Perhaps the closest case to the present is Pedroni, in 
which the government offered two reasons for the fourteen day 
delay in sealing the tapes:  the heavy workload of the FBI agent 
responsible for preparing the tapes for sealing and the 
unavailability of the judge.  Notwithstanding the fact that the 
reasons provided by the government in Pedroni are comparable to 
the explanations here, our decision in Carson steers us away from 
delays caused by a prosecutor's ordinary responsibilities, 
despite how onerous those ordinary responsibilities may be.  To 
 
 
the extent that Pedroni supports the government's position, we 
decline to follow it. 
          In summary, we conclude that a prosecutor's routine 
duties, hectic as that routine may be, are not a satisfactory 
explanation for failing to comply with the immediacy requirement 
of § 2518(8)(a).  Were we to agree with the government, we would 
be rendering extraordinary that which is ordinary.  We decline to 
do so. 
 D. 
          The second rationale offered by the government is that 
Judge Giles's unavailability should be considered a satisfactory 
explanation for a part of the delay.  The courts of appeal which 
have considered the question of whether a judge's absence can 
serve as a satisfactory excuse have reached opposite conclusions.  
Compare United States v. Pedroni, 958 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 
1992) ("unavailability of the issuing or supervising judge may 
constitute a satisfactory explanation for a sealing delay"); with 
United States v. Rodriguez, 786 F.2d 472, 476 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(government's reliance on the absence of issuing judge to explain 
part of the delay is unacceptable given prior Second Circuit 
decisions which made clear that other judges could properly seal 
tapes).  In reaching its decision in Pedroni, the Ninth Circuit 
expressly relied upon prior Second Circuit decisions which held 
that a judge's unavailability could serve as a satisfactory 
explanation for a delay in sealing.  See United States v. Fury, 
 
 
554 F.2d 522, 533 (2d Cir. 1977) (six day delay reasonably 
explained by unavailability of issuing judge who was on 
vacation), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 931 (1978); United States v. 
Poeta, 455 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir.) (thirteen day delay approved 
where agents assumed issuing judge must seal tapes), cert. 
denied, 406 U.S. 948 (1972).  However, subsequent to Fury and 
Poeta, the Second Circuit noted in United States v. Vazquez, 605 
F.2d 1269, 1280 n.25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 
(1979), that "tapes sealed by a judge other than the 'issuing 
judge,' because of the absence or unavailability of the latter, 
are considered properly sealed."  This language in Vazquez was 
the express basis for the Second Circuit's later decision in 
Rodriguez that it would no longer consider a judge's 
unavailability as a satisfactory excuse for a sealing delay. 
          Judge Giles, who had approved the initial authorization 
and both extensions to conduct electronic surveillance of Paz's 
cellular phone, was unavailable before November 4, 1991, because 
he was sitting in the Virgin Islands.   We find, however, that 
the fourteen day delay after Judge Giles's return is excessive 
under the standards of Ojeda Rios.  For this reason, we do not 
need to, and we will not, decide whether the absence of the 
supervising judge, in and of itself, is sufficient excuse for any 
delay in sealing.  Nevertheless, we do note in this regard, that 
any judge in the district can order the tapes sealed, as did 




          The final argument for admissibility of the tapes 
arises from the fact that the FBI exercised elaborate and 
painstaking procedures to insure their integrity.  As the 
district court found, the tapes remained "sealed (although not 
officially under judicial holograph), locked away in secure 
evidence storage, unbudged and untouched" prior to the judicial 
sealing and the "actual integrity of the tapes has not been 
challenged."  Dist. Ct. Order at 6.  But as the Supreme Court 
held in Ojeda Rios, "[t]o hold that proof of nontampering is a 
substitute for a satisfactory explanation is foreclosed by the 
plain words of the sealing provision."  495 U.S. at 264-65.  
Because we find that the government has failed to offer a 
satisfactory explanation for the delay in sealing the October 
tapes, § 2518(8)(a)'s "explicit exclusionary remedy" must be 
employed.  Id. at 260. 
 IV. 
          Given our decision that the October tapes should have 
been suppressed, we now turn to the question of whether the 
admission of the October wiretap evidence was harmless error.  At 
oral argument, we invited the parties to submit briefs addressing 
the issue of harmless error.  We have carefully reviewed these 
submissions. 
          As a preliminary matter, the convictions for use of a 
communication facility, which are based on communications 
 
 
intercepted and recorded on the October tapes, will be reversed.  
Quintero was convicted of three such counts:   Count Seventeen, 
based on an October 11, 1991, telephone call; Count Nineteen, 
based on an October 23, 1991, telephone call; and Count Twenty, 
based on an October 26, 1991, telephone call.  Santiago Gonzalez 
was convicted on Count Twenty-One, based on an October 28, 1991, 
telephone call.  Mordago was convicted on Count Eighteen, based 
on an October 12, 1991, telephone call.  Without the October 
tapes, the government concedes that there is no evidence to 
sustain the defendants' convictions on these counts.10 
          We now turn to those convictions which require a more 
extensive review of whether the admission of the October tapes 
constituted harmless error.  In making this assessment, we first 
must determine whether the error alleged is constitutional or 
nonconstitutional.  See United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 
290 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding that challenged jury instruction did 
not affect any possible constitutional right, court applied 
                     
10.  In its supplemental brief the government states that Maria 
Rodriguez's conviction on the telephone count should be reversed 
if the October tapes are suppressed.  Rodriguez was indicted on 
two counts of use of a telephone to facilitate the conspiracy in 
Count One.  Count Thirteen was based on a telephone call on 
September 5, 1991, and Count Fifteen was based on a telephone 
call on October 10, 1991.  At trial, Rodriguez was convicted on 
Count Thirteen, but acquitted on Count Fifteen.  This result is 
confirmed in both the docket sheet and sentencing report signed 
by the district court.  Given the fact that Rodriguez was not 
convicted on the telephone related count based on her October 10, 
1991, conversation with Paz, there is no need to reverse.  Her 
convictions will be discussed infra. 
 
 
"highly probable" standard of appellate review to assess the 
question of harmless error), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1018 (1987). 
          We find that the dispute here involves a claim of 
nonconstitutional error in that it is based solely on a violation 
of § 2518(8)(a).  Therefore, in deciding whether the admission of 
the October tapes constituted harmless error, we must evaluate 
whether it is "highly probable that the evidence did not 
contribute to the jury's judgment of conviction."  Government of 
Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 284 (3d Cir. 1976).  "'High 
probability' requires that the court have a 'sure conviction that 
the error did not prejudice the defendant,' but need not disprove 
every 'reasonable possibility' of prejudice."  Grayson, 795 F.2d 
at 290 (quoting United States v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213, 219-220 
n.2 (3d Cir.) cert. denied 469 U.S. 880 (1984)).  We will review 
each defendant's convictions applying this standard. 
 A. Jose Gonzalez-Rivera 
          The jury found Jose Gonzalez-Rivera guilty of one count 
of conspiracy to distribute in excess of five kilograms of 
cocaine (Count One), one count of engaging in a CCE (Count Two), 
two counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine 
(Counts Five and Six), and one count of use of a communication 
facility to facilitate the conspiracy in Count One (Count Eight).  
None of Gonzalez-Rivera's convictions were based directly on 
conversations recorded on the October tapes.   
 
 
          Gonzalez-Rivera's conviction on the telephone count 
(Count Eight) was based on a conversation between Paz and 
Gonzalez-Rivera on August 9, 1991.  We have held that the August 
tapes were admissible.  Admission of the October tapes was 
clearly harmless as to the conviction on this count.     
          The evidence on the remaining counts against Gonzalez-
Rivera was substantial.  Count Five was based on the fifteen 
kilograms of cocaine seized by the New Jersey police when Cruz 
and Rosario were stopped on the New Jersey Turnpike on June 26, 
1991.  Paz testified that he and Rosario had travelled to New 
York in late June 1991 in order to receive this cocaine from 
Gonzalez-Rivera.  Paz testified that, although he returned to 
Philadelphia before the cocaine had been delivered, Gonzalez-
Rivera called him to report that it had arrived.   
          Count Six was based on the seizure of six kilograms of 
cocaine from the residence of Lopez-Ortega on July 15, 1991.  
Regarding this cocaine, Paz testified that he had travelled to 
New York in a load car rented from MRK in order to pick up a 
large quality of cocaine from Gonzalez-Rivera.  Paz further 
testified that he accepted twenty kilograms of cocaine from 
Gonzalez-Rivera but that he did not like the quality of the 
remaining six kilograms, nor would they fit into the concealed 
compartment of his car.  According to Paz, Gonzalez-Rivera called 
Ortega and asked that he remove the remaining six kilograms of 
cocaine from Gonzalez-Rivera's residence because Gonzalez-Rivera 
 
 
was concerned that law enforcement officials were conducting 
surveillance of him and Paz.  Surveillance did in fact establish 
that Ortega then transported a gym bag from Gonzalez-Rivera's 
residence in the Bronx to Lopez-Ortega's residence in Queens, New 
York.  A gym bag containing six kilograms of cocaine was seized 
from Lopez-Ortega's residence that evening.  Because of the 
strong evidence in support of Counts Five and Six, we find that 
the introduction of the October tapes was clearly harmless as to 
Gonzalez-Rivera's convictions on these counts. 
          Gonzalez-Rivera asserts, however, that the admission of 
the October tapes constituted prejudicial error in regard to the 
conspiracy and CCE convictions (Counts One and Two) because two 
telephone conversations, recorded in October, were used to 
establish his connection to Guillermo (a/k/a Memo), a drug 
supplier in Medellin, Colombia.  Gonzalez-Rivera asserts that 
these conversations supported the government's contention that he 
was a "leader of a Medellin cocaine cartel 'cell' in New York 
City" as alleged in Count One.   
          Gonzalez-Rivera was not recorded on either of these 
October tapes.  Both of these calls involved Paz and Rodriguez 
and took place on October 11, 1991.  During the first 
conversation, Rodriguez relayed a message from Gonzalez-Rivera to 
Paz for Paz to call Guillermo in Medellin, Colombia, regarding a 
$6,000 payment that Guillermo was demanding.  Rodriguez supplied 
Paz with Guillermo's phone number in Medellin.  Immediately after 
 
 
his conversation with Rodriguez, Paz attempted to call Guillermo.  
When Paz supplied Guillermo's number to the operator, the 
operator told Paz that the call could not be billed to Paz's 
cellular telephone.  At this point, the call was interrupted on 
"call waiting" by Rodriguez.  During this second conversation, 
Rodriguez informed Paz that Gonzalez-Rivera wanted Paz to call 
him immediately instead of talking to Guillermo.  Paz's trial 
testimony confirmed the content of these conversations. 
          Gonzalez-Rivera's defense depended in part on his own 
testimony that he was not a member of the Medellin cartel.  On 
direct examination, Gonzalez-Rivera testified that Memo was a 
loan shark in New York from whom Gonzalez-Rivera had borrowed 
$6,000.11  In an effort to impeach Gonzalez-Rivera's testimony 
                     
11.  Gonzalez-Rivera testified on direct examination as follows: 
 
 Q: There was great deal of testimony about a 
guy named Memo, do you remember that? 
 
 A: Yes, I remember the man. 
 
 Q: Tell the jury who Memo is? 
 
 A: Memo is a big shot in New York that lent 
me money.  He lent me six thousand dollars. 
 
 Q: Is Memo a loan shark? 
 
 A: Yes. 
 
 Q: Now, when did you talk to Memo about 
getting six thousand dollars? 
 
 A: After Mr. Paz, he owed me the money. 
 




concerning Memo, the government on cross-examination questioned 
Gonzalez-Rivera with regard to the two telephone conversations.12  
(..continued) 
 
 A: Yes. 
 
Trial Transcript ("TT") at 51 (Sept. 16, 1992). 
12.  The government cross-examined Gonzalez-Rivera as follows: 
 
 Q: And Memo is this loan shark who lives in the Bronx? 
 
 A: Yes. 
 
 Q: You have been feeding Paz's ego by saying 
that he lives in Colombia? 
 
 A: No. 
 
 Q: You never said that? 
 
 A: No. 
 
 Q: You never told Maria Rodriguez to tell Paz 
to call Memo in Colombia? 
 
 A: Yeah, I told Maria. I told Maria, but I 
gave a fax number.  He never went through 
with it because he never talked to me, Memo. 
 
 Q: You heard the phone call where he tried to 
call Colombia? 
 
 A: Yeah.  You hear, he never talked to Memo. 
 
 Q: Did you hear the operator say that the 
billing was denied? 
 
 A: Yes. 
 
 Q: So he could not charge the call? 
 
 A: Yes, but he never got through with it. I 





In addition, the government made reference to the conversations 
during its closing argument as evidence of Gonzalez-Rivera's 
connection to Medellin.   
 Gonzalez-Rivera asserts prejudice in that the telephone 
conversations provided confirmation of Paz's testimony on direct 
examination that Gonzalez-Rivera received large quantities of 
cocaine from suppliers in Medellin.  He contends that the 
combined effect of the use of these recordings constituted 
prejudicial error leading to his conviction on the conspiracy and 
CCE counts. 
          In conducting the harmless error analysis, we must keep 
in mind that the government produced admissible testimony by Paz, 
a participant in the calls, about the calls.  However, would the 
jury have credited Paz's uncorroborated version of the calls 
without any other support?  We must consider whether the jury's 
exposure to the content of the calls induced the jurors to give 
undue credit to Paz's testimony, rather than to Gonzalez-
Rivera's. 
(..continued) 
 Q: Why would you give a telephone number of a 
loan shark that you met in the Bronx?  Why 
did you give a number to Medellin in Colombia 
to Paz? 
 
 A: That's what they wanted to hear, Paz. 
 
 Q: This was part of you feeding his ego? 
 
 A: Yes. 
 
TT at 114-15 (Sept. 16, 1992).  
 
 
          There is precedent, however, to support the admission 
of the content of the tapes for impeachment purposes even if the 
tapes were inadmissible on the merits of the government's case.  
In view of Gonzalez-Rivera's testimony on direct examination 
about his relationship with Memo, the tapes of the calls could 
have been used to attack Gonzalez-Rivera's credibility.  Even 
though the two conversations should not have been admitted during 
the government's case-in-chief, unlawfully obtained evidence may 
be used to impeach the direct testimony a defendant gives at 
trial.  See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).  In 
Walder, the Supreme Court held that it was permissible for the 
government to use testimony regarding drugs obtained in an 
illegal search to impeach the testimony of the defendant that he 
had never possessed any narcotics.   
          On direct examination here, Gonzalez-Rivera testified 
that Memo was a loan shark in New York to whom Gonzalez-Rivera 
owed $6,000.  As a result, the issue of Gonzalez-Rivera's 
relationship to Memo was clearly brought into question by 
Gonzalez-Rivera's direct testimony.  Once he put his relationship 
to Memo in issue by offering the loan shark explanation, the 
government was entitled to rebut this explanation by showing that 
Gonzalez-Rivera's testimony was untrue.  Although the content of 
these two tapes was admissible only to impeach Gonzalez-Rivera's 
testimony about Memo, and not admissible as direct evidence of 
Gonzalez-Rivera's involvement with Memo, it was precisely this 
 
 
aspect of the testimony that Gonzalez-Rivera complains of, i.e., 
that the jury believed Paz, rather than Gonzalez-Rivera, on the 
question of Gonzalez's relationship with Memo and the Medellin 
cartel.  Because this element of the evidence, the impeachment 
factor, was permissible under the circumstances, we find the 
spill over into the merits of the government's case to be 
harmless.13 
          Moreover, our review of the record indicates that the 
other evidence, tying Gonzalez-Rivera to the Medellin cartel, was 
                     
13.  The use of the October calls to impeach Gonzalez-Rivera is 
further supported by his testimony during the initial phase of 
the government's cross-examination. See United States v. Havens, 
446 U.S. 620 (1980).  On cross-examination, Gonzalez-Rivera 
testified that many of his telephone conversations with Paz 
recorded by the government during August and September 1991 
concerned $6,000 that Paz owed him from an earlier debt, money 
which Gonzalez-Rivera testified he planned to use to pay off 
Memo.  In Havens, the Supreme Court considered whether "evidence 
suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure may 
nevertheless be used to impeach a defendant's false trial 
testimony, given in response to proper cross-examination, where 
the evidence does not squarely contradict the defendant's 
testimony on direct examination."  446 U.S. at 621.  While Walder 
is more on point to the present case because Gonzalez-Rivera did 
testify as to Memo's identity on direct examination, Havens is 
also instructive.  The Supreme Court held that "a defendant's 
statements made in response to proper cross-examination 
reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct examination are 
subject to otherwise proper impeachment by the government, albeit 
by evidence that has been illegally obtained and that is 
inadmissible on the government's direct case, or otherwise, as 
substantive evidence of guilt."  Id. at 627-28.  Not only could 
the government use the fact of the two calls to impeach the 
defendant's direct testimony that Memo was a loan shark in New 
York, such evidence could have been used to impeach the 




substantial.  Paz testified that Gonzalez-Rivera served as one of 
his major cocaine suppliers.  In describing his trip to Gonzalez-
Rivera's residence in April, 1991, to pick up fifteen kilograms 
of cocaine from Gonzalez-Rivera and Cruz, Paz testified that 
Gonzalez-Rivera received his cocaine from Medellin.   
 
 Q: Now, you've testified that with respect to 
Jose Gonzalez-Rivera, that the cocaine that 
he received came from Medellin, Colombia? 
 
          A: Yes, sir. 
 
          Q: How did you know that? 
 
 A: Because the telephone calls that he was 
making to Colombia, he made a lot of calls in 
front of me. 
 
 Q: And what were those calls?  What was discussed 
during those calls that you were present during that 
period? 
 
 A: Well, when we lost 15 kilos on the turnpike, that 
was one of the things that he had to call down there, 
to Medellin to talk to his bosses about, and the other 
one was some money -- they stole some merchandise from 
me in Philadelphia. 
 
 Q: When you refer to merchandise, what are 
you referring to? 
 
          A: Cocaine. 
 
 Q: Now, did you know the names of the 
individuals that Jose Gonzalez would speak to 
in Colombia? 
 
          A: Yes. Guillermo. 
 
 Q: Did you ever get to know an individual by 
the name of Memo? 
 
 A: No, I didn't meet him.  I did not speak to 




          Q: Who was Memo to Jose Gonzalez-Rivera? 
 
          A: His boss. 
 
          Q: His boss for what? 
 
          A: For cocaine. 
 
          . . . 
 
          Q: So Guillermo and Memo are one in [sic] the same? 
 
          A: Yes, sir. 
TT at 27-29 (Sept. 2, 1992; Afternoon Session). 
           The government presented other evidence of Gonzalez-
Rivera's connection to Memo:  During a conversation recorded on 
August 1, 1991, Paz and Gonzalez-Rivera discussed Cruz's arrest 
and the seizure of the fifteen kilograms of cocaine; Paz 
testified that they discussed the need to send Cruz's arrest 
papers to Memo in Medellin, in an effort to justify the loss of 
the fifteen kilograms; during a conversation recorded on August 
17, 1991, Paz and Gonzalez-Rivera discussed a cocaine 
transaction; when Paz informed Gonzalez-Rivera that he could get 
a very high price for cocaine, Gonzalez-Rivera responded that he 
was "gonna call that man down south"; Paz testified that he 
understood the defendant to be referring to Memo in Medellin.14  
Paz testified that he understood these references to be to Memo. 
                     
14.  This was one of several instances in which Gonzalez-Rivera 
makes reference to a "man down south" in connection with a 




          In another telephone conversation, recorded on 
September 21, 1991, Gonzalez-Rivera told Paz that Gonzalez-Rivera 
had given up a piece of property in Colombia as security for a 
debt of $34,000 that Paz owed to Gonzalez-Rivera and that 
Gonzalez-Rivera in turn owed to "that man."  Paz testified that 
Gonzalez-Rivera owned a condominium and large farm in Medellin. 
          In total, Paz testified in regard to fifteen telephone 
conversations, between himself and Gonzalez-Rivera, which were 
recorded by the government wiretap between August 1 and October 
29, 1991.  Thirteen of these recordings were properly admitted.  
The jury had the opportunity to listen to each of these 
conversations and at the same time to review a transcript of 
them.  Paz pointed out specific portions of each telephone call 
in which he and Gonzalez-Rivera discussed their drug business.   
          The government also presented the testimony of FBI 
agent Harold Clouse as an expert witness in the field of drug 
jargon analysis.  Clouse reviewed the entire set of tape 
recordings and testified as to eight telephone conversations 
between Paz and Gonzalez-Rivera.  Of these eight calls, only one 
was recorded during October.  The other seven were properly 
admitted.   
          Clouse testified that a majority of these calls were 
drug related.  For instance, he testified that a telephone 
conversation between Paz and Gonzalez-Rivera, recorded on August 
14, was a drug related call in which Gonzalez-Rivera quoted Paz a 
 
 
price for a kilogram of cocaine and they discuss how much Paz 
could charge his buyers for it.  Clouse testified that there were 
other references in this conversation to cocaine which Gonzalez-
Rivera planned to supply to Paz.   In addition, Clouse testified 
that three days later, on August 17, Paz and Gonzalez-Rivera 
engaged in a drug related conversation in which they discussed 
the price of a kilogram of cocaine.  In connection with this 
telephone call, Paz described how the cocaine he received from 
Gonzalez-Rivera was supplied to Gonzalez-Rivera:  A call would be 
made to an individual in Colombia, that person would call New 
York to authorize delivery of cocaine, and the cocaine would be 
delivered the next day.  Asked how he knew about this 
arrangement, Paz responded that Gonzalez-Rivera had explained it 
to him.  Paz testified that, after these arrangements were made, 
he would pick up his cocaine at Gonzalez-Rivera's residence in 
the Bronx. 
          In addition, FBI agent McGowan testified that at the 
time of Gonzalez-Rivera's arrest, Gonzalez-Rivera had Memo's 
telephone number handwritten on several pieces of paper in his 
wallet.  This number corresponded to a telephone number that, at 
the time of Paz's arrest, Paz had in his address book under the 
name of Guillermo.   
          Despite this evidence, Gonzalez-Rivera asserts that the 
admission of the two October calls constituted prejudicial error.  
It is true that the government made reference to the two October 
 
 
calls during its closing argument as evidence of Gonzalez-
Rivera's connection to Medellin.  We find, however, that the 
references to these two phone conversations were merely 
cumulative of other substantial evidence connecting Gonzalez-
Rivera to this conspiracy. 
          We conclude that, in light of all this evidence, 
Gonzalez-Rivera was not prejudiced by the erroneous admission of 
the October tapes.  For that reason, their admission was harmless 
as to his conviction on Counts One and Two.  See United States v. 
Jannotti, 729 F.2d at 219-20 (to find error harmless, we must 
have a sure conviction that the error did not prejudice the 
defendant; yet we need not disprove every possibility of 
prejudice).  We will uphold Gonzalez-Rivera's convictions on all 
of the counts for which he was convicted.   
           B. Maria Rodriguez 
          Maria Rodriguez was convicted of one count of 
conspiracy to distribute in excess of five kilograms of cocaine 
(Count One) and one count of use of a communication facility to 
facilitate the conspiracy in Count One (Count Thirteen).  The 
conviction on Count Thirteen was based on a September 5, 1991, 
phone call.  Since we have held that the September tapes were 
admissible, the admission of the October tapes was clearly 
harmless error as to Count Thirteen. 
          Turning to the conspiracy conviction, Rodriguez in her 
supplemental brief adopted the arguments advanced by Gonzalez-
 
 
Rivera as to the prejudicial effect of the admission of the 
October tapes.  The government asserts that the admission of the 
October tapes constituted harmless error based on the substantial 
evidence, excluding the October calls, against Rodriguez.   
          The government's evidence against Rodriguez consisted 
of testimony by Paz and FBI agent Clouse about items seized from 
the defendant at the time of her arrest15 and about five 
telephone conversations between the defendant and Paz.  Two of 
the five conversations were recorded in September 1991, with the 
remaining three recorded in October 1991.  Paz testified as to 
all five calls and his participation in them.  Clouse testified 
as to four of the five calls, identifying each as drug related.   
          The first of these calls was made on September 5.  In 
it, Paz and Rodriguez discussed Paz's request for five kilograms 
of cocaine in exchange for $100,000 and of an additional five 
kilograms of cocaine on consignment.  Rodriguez asked Paz, "[F]or 
how many are you striking for?"  Paz responded, "Okay, tell him 
that we can get five for cash and five on credit for me."   Paz 
testified that he had made this telephone call to Rodriguez at 
home because he believed Gonzalez-Rivera's telephone at work was 
being tapped.  He further testified that Rodriguez was acting as 
                     
15.  These items included a receipt for a $25 money order for 
Jose Cruz; the work and beeper numbers for Gonzalez-Rivera; the 
home, beeper, and cellular telephone numbers for Paz; and the 
home phone numbers of Ortega and another codefendant.   
 
 
a messenger for Gonzalez-Rivera.  Clouse confirmed that this call 
was drug related. 
          During the September 6 call, Paz informed Rodriguez 
that $15,000 from another drug deal had been stolen from him the 
night before at Rodriguez's cousin's house in New York.  During 
this conversation, Rodriguez told Paz that she thought he had 
lost "material" or "sugar for coffee."  Clouse testified that 
Rodriguez's use of the word "material" was a code word for 
cocaine and that this was a drug related call.  
          Two of the October calls took place on October 11, 
1991.  The third October call took place on October 17, 1991.  
During it, Rodriguez urged Paz to call Gonzalez-Rivera.  
Rodriguez expressed concern that Paz and Gonzalez-Rivera were not 
talking to each other, at which point Paz responded that he 
needed work to pay his debts.  Clouse identified this as a drug 
related call in which Paz told Rodriguez that he needed cocaine 
to sell.  Paz's testimony confirmed Clouse's interpretation.   
          In adopting the prejudicial error argument advanced by 
Gonzalez-Rivera, Rodriguez is essentially asserting that the 
October calls had the effect of tying her to the conspiracy.  
However, we agree with the government that Rodriguez's September 
5, 1991, conversation established her active role in the 
conspiracy.  In conducting a harmless error analysis,  we need 
not disprove every reasonable possibility of prejudice to the 
defendant.  Rather, we shall affirm in those cases in which we 
 
 
have a sure conviction that the error did not prejudice the 
defendant.  See Jannotti, 729 F.2d at 219-20.  In this instance, 
we conclude that the evidence of the September 5, 1991, call and 
the testimony concerning its substance is sufficient to affirm 
Rodriguez's conviction. 
           C. Santiago Gonzalez 
          Santiago Gonzalez was convicted of one telephone count 
which was based on the tape of an improperly admitted October 
phone call (Count Twenty-One).  The government concedes that his 
conviction on this count must be reversed and we will do so. 
Gonzalez's remaining convictions include conspiracy to distribute 
in excess of five kilograms of cocaine (Count One) and two counts 
of distribution of cocaine (Counts Fourteen and Sixteen).   
          Gonzalez's argument concerning the prejudicial impact 
of the October tapes is, in our view, intertwined with his other 
arguments on appeal.  Consequently, we will consider all of his 
contentions together.  He advances three major challenges to his 
convictions. 
          First, Gonzalez contends that the district court 
committed plain error when it failed, sua sponte, to sever his 
trial from Joaquin Mordago's once it became clear that "Mordago's 
antagonistic defense prevented [Gonzalez] from receiving a fair 
trial."  Gonzalez contends that Mordago's "authorized informant" 
defense was antagonistic to his own defense, thereby presenting 
the jury with no option but to convict at least one of them.  
 
 
Gonzalez claims that once Mordago's defense unfolded at trial, 
the district court was required to grant a mistrial and 
severance. 
          Second, Gonzalez asserts that his conspiracy conviction 
should be vacated because there was a variance between the single 
conspiracy charged in the indictment and the evidence presented, 
which demonstrated multiple conspiracies.  Gonzalez contends that 
the prejudice resulting from the purported variance was the 
impact it had on the district court's decision to try all of the 
defendants together rather than sever Gonzalez's trial from his 
co-defendants' or later from Mordago's.   
          Third, Gonzalez contends that the admission of the 
October tapes was not harmless error because it supplied the only 
evidence to support the government's contention that Gonzalez was 
part of the single conspiracy alleged in Count One.  As a result, 
the admission of the October tapes compounded the purported error 
of the variance between the single conspiracy charged in Count 
One and the multiple conspiracies which Gonzalez claims were 
described at trial.  While Gonzalez did not expressly set out the 
prejudicial impact flowing from the admission of the October 
tapes, it is clear from his assertion relating to the "variance" 
challenge that he contends that it was only through the October 
tapes that the government established that Gonzalez was aware 
that Paz had other sources of supply.  In sum, Gonzalez asserts 
that these three errors, individually and cumulatively, 
 
 
prejudiced his right to a trial separate from co-defendant 
Mordago, given the claim that Mordago presented a mutually 
antagonistic defense.  Because we find that Gonzalez was not 
prejudiced in this manner, we hold that his convictions must be 
upheld. 
 i. Gonzalez's Claim of Variance 
          A defendant alleging a variance between a single 
conspiracy charged in an indictment and the proof presented at 
trial must demonstrate, first, that there was such a variance 
and, second, that the variance prejudiced one of his substantial 
rights.  United States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(citing United States v. Schurr, 755 F.2d 549, 553 (3d Cir. 
1985)).  However, even if we were to find that Gonzalez has 
demonstrated that a variance existed here, we are not convinced 
that he was prejudiced. 
          First of all, in the matter of the variance, a single 
drug conspiracy may involve numerous suppliers and distributors 
operating under the aegis of a common core group.  United States 
v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1989).  To establish a 
single conspiracy, the prosecutor need not prove that each 
defendant knew all the details, goals or other participants.  See 
United States v. Padilla, 982 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1992).  The 
prosecution must, however, demonstrate that a defendant, charging 
variance, knew that he was part of a larger drug operation.  Id. 
at 114; Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d at 594.  Gonzalez argues that 
 
 
the only way by which the government showed he was aware of the 
larger operation was through two of the October telephone calls.  
However, our review of the record does not support this 
allegation.  There was also separate testimony by Paz concerning 
his discussions with Gonzalez about cocaine in New York which 
needed to be treated in order to dry it.  Because there was 
evidence through Paz's testimony, which demonstrated that 
Gonzalez was aware of the larger operation, the jury's finding of 
a single conspiracy is supported even without the October tapes.            
Moreover, pursuant to Kelly, demonstrating that a variance 
existed is not enough.  Even if there were not admissible 
evidence to establish the single conspiracy, still Gonzalez must 
show prejudice.  In his brief, Gonzalez argues that the prejudice 
he suffered from the purported variance was his being tried with 
Mordago:  "The prejudice to [Gonzalez] was that even though he 
made a strong case for separating his trial from his co-
defendants, the district court was naturally reluctant to grant 
the severance due to the fact that [Gonzalez] was charged with 
being part of a single conspiracy.  Consequently, he was tried 
with Mordago.  Mordago, in presenting his 'authorized informant' 
defense, implicated [Gonzalez] in the drug conspiracy."  This 
claimed prejudice is the same as the claimed prejudice resulting 
from Gonzalez's initial challenge, i.e., that the district court 
committed plain error when it failed, sua sponte, to sever 
Gonzalez's trial from Mordago's once it became clear that 
 
 
Mordago's antagonistic defense prevented him from receiving a 
fair trial.  We will turn, therefore, to that assertion. 
 ii. Gonzalez's Claim of Prejudice 
          Gonzalez filed a pretrial motion to sever his case from 
the New York based co-defendants, contending that the government 
would be unable to prove a unified conspiracy and that he would 
be prejudiced by being tried with these co-defendants.  This 
motion was denied by the district court and Gonzalez does not 
challenge it on appeal.  Rather, Gonzalez now asserts, for the 
first time, that "unforeseen developments" at trial, i.e., 
Mordago's "authorized informant" defense, required that the 
district court grant, sua sponte, a mistrial and severance as to 
Gonzalez.  In support, Gonzalez cites our decision in United 
States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 309 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 494 U.S. 1089 (1990), for the proposition that "[t]he 
district court has to grant severance if it becomes obvious after 
the commencement of trial that joinder is no longer appropriate."  
 As an initial matter, we do not read Sandini as broadly 
as Gonzalez suggests we should.  We noted in Sandini that, in 
considering whether a district court committed plain error in 
failing to grant a mistrial and severance sua sponte based on 
developments at trial, "we acknowledge that an appropriate denial 
of a pretrial motion for severance does not preclude a later 
ruling that there should be a severance because of prejudice 
which develops at trial."  888 F.2d at 309 (citing Schaffer v. 
 
 
United States, 362 U.S. 511, 516 (1960)).  Sandini does not, 
however, announce a mandatory requirement for severance.  A 
finding that severance might be appropriate based on developments 
at trial does not compel the conclusion that a severance is 
required whenever a trial fails to unfold as expected.  As we 
proceeded to note in Sandini: 
 [I]t is risky business for a judge on his own 
motion to declare a mistrial, as the 
defendant may thereafter contend that he was 
entitled to a completion of the first trial 
so that a retrial is barred by double 
jeopardy principles.  Thus, the defendant 
who, without asking for a mistrial gets one, 
will surely argue, and not unreasonably, that 
if he did not, as here, regard the alleged 
error as serious enough even to prompt his 
reaction, a court is effectively granting a 
mistrial over his objection without "manifest 
necessity" so that his retrial is barred.  
Furthermore, we point out that declaring a 
mistrial because of the conduct at trial of a 
codefendant, as opposed to that of the 
government, may well encourage collusive 
conduct by defendants at a joint trial so as 
to set the stage for mistrials and possible 
reversals.  The considerations we have set 
forth lead us to approach [defendant's] 
argument with considerable caution. 
Id.   
          As to what was the "unforeseen development," Gonzalez 
contends that he "did not anticipate . . . that Mordago would 
implicate him in drug dealing, and discredit his defense that he 
was a complete stranger to the drug conspiracy."   
          Our review of the record, however, clearly indicates 
that Mordago's defense was anything but unforeseen.  More than a 
 
 
month before the trial, all defense counsel involved in this 
case, including Gonzalez's, were alerted to Mordago's intention 
to assert an authorized informant defense.  On July 20, 1992, 
each defense counsel was sent a copy of the government's response 
opposing Mordago's pretrial motion to disqualify the United 
States Attorney's Office from prosecuting him.  Mordago's motion 
was based on the claim that he was acting as a government 
informant in connection with the charges contained in the 
indictment.  Govt. App. at 608 ("Consolidated Response in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motions to Disqualify and Compel 
Discovery").  Even a cursory reading of the government's response 
reveals Mordago's intended defense.  Early in its response, the 
government stated: "In his motion to disqualify, Mordago claims 
that he was acting as a government informant in connection with 
these charges."  Several pages later, the government stated:  "In 
his motion to disqualify, Mordago alleges that in light of the 
public authority defense that he intends to assert, AUSA Cohan 
may be called as [a] defense of prosecution witness."  Thus, 
Gonzalez's counsel was on notice at least a full month before the 
trial commenced that Mordago planned to assert the government 
informant defense.             
          Notwithstanding this information, Gonzalez failed to 
amend his pretrial motion for severance.16  In addition, not once 
                     
16.  Gonzalez filed his pretrial motion for severance on May 19, 
1992.  This motion did not specifically allege any prejudice from 
being jointly tried with Mordago.  Rather, the focus of the 
defendant's motion was his claim that evidence against the New 
 
 
during the trial did Gonzalez's counsel object to what he now 
claims were prejudicial errors made by the district court 
relating to Mordago's defense.  Rather, Gonzalez argues that the 
court, sua sponte, should have granted a severance once Mordago's 
defense became clear.   
 Because Gonzalez did not object to Mordago's defense or 
to the failure to sever, we review the district court's action 
for plain error.  In reviewing for plain error, we are guided by 
the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Olano, 
113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776 (1993) which noted that: 
 There must be an "error" that is "plain" and 
that "affect[s] substantial rights."  
Moreover, Rule 52(b) leaves the decision to 
correct the forfeited error within the sound 
discretion of the Court of Appeals, and the 
court should not exercise that discretion 
unless the error "'seriously affect[s] the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.'"  
 
(citations omitted). 
          In order for Gonzalez to demonstrate that the district 
court committed plain error, the defendant must first establish 
that he was entitled to a trial separate from Mordago.  If 
Gonzalez fails to establish that he was entitled to a separate 
trial, then our analysis must stop, for the district court would 
(..continued) 
York based conspirators would "spillover" and unduly prejudice 
Gonzalez as it related to Count One of the indictment.  The 
defendant's motion, never amended to include any potential 




not have committed any error at all.  Before turning to the 
specific circumstances which form the basis of Gonzalez's claim, 
we must examine the substantive aspects of a failure to sever. 
          In Zafiro v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 933, 936 (1993), 
the Supreme Court considered whether Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 14 "requires severance as a matter of law when co-
defendants present 'mutually antagonistic defenses.'" 113 S. Ct. 
at 936.17  After expressing the federal system's strong 
preference for joint trials, the Court held that severance was 
not automatically required in such cases.  The Court stated: 
 Mutually antagonistic defenses are not 
prejudicial per se.  Moreover, Rule 14 does 
not require severance even if prejudice is 
shown; rather, it leaves the tailoring of the 
relief to be granted, if any, to the district 
court's sound discretion. . . .  We believe 
that, when defendants properly have been 
joined under Rule 8(b),18 a district court 
                     
17.  Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 14 provides in part: 
 
 If it appears that a defendant or the 
government is prejudiced by a joinder of 
offenses or of defendants in an indictment or 
information or by such joinder for trial 
together, the court may order an election or 
separate trials of counts, grant a severance 
of defendants or provide whatever other 
relief justice requires. 




should grant a severance under Rule 14 only 
if there is a serious risk that a joint trial 
would compromise a specific trial right of 
one of the defendants, or prevent the jury 
from making a reliable judgment about guilt 
or innocence. 
Id. at 938 (citations omitted). 
          While the Court did not delineate all the circumstances 
in which a defendant could be prejudiced, it did note the types 
of situations in which prejudice might develop. 
 Such a risk might occur when evidence that 
the jury should not consider against a 
defendant and that would not be admissible if 
the defendant were tried alone is admitted 
against a codefendant.  For example, evidence 
of a codefendant's wrongdoing in some 
circumstances erroneously could lead a jury 
to conclude that a defendant was guilty.  
When many defendants are tried together in a 
complex case and they have markedly different 
degrees of culpability, the risk of prejudice 
is heightened.  See Kotteakos v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 750, 774-775, 66 S. Ct. 
1239, 1252-1253, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946).  
Evidence that is probative of a defendant's 
guilt but technically admissible only against 
a codefendant also might present a risk of 
prejudice.  See Bruton v. United States, 391 




 Two or more defendants may be charged in the 
same indictment or information if they are 
alleged to have participated in the same act 
or transaction or in the same series of acts 
or transactions constituting an offense or 
offenses.  Such defendants may be charged in 
one or more counts together or separately and 




          While Gonzalez's pretrial motion was based on a 
Kotteakos claim, he does not appeal the denial of that motion.  
Rather, he now asserts a Bruton related violation.  His claim of 
prejudice is based on the proposition that Mordago's government 
informant defense resulted in the admission of certain evidence, 
allegedly incriminating to Gonzalez, without providing Gonzalez 
an opportunity to cross-examine Mordago.   
          Gonzalez points to several portions of Mordago's 
defense which, he alleges, specifically prejudiced his right to a 
fair trial.  To review these, we will start with Mordago's 
release from prison on October 3, 1991.  Mordago talked with law 
enforcement officials three times between the time of his release 
and his arrest on the current charges on November 8, 1991.  
During each conversation, Mordago was advised by the government 
that he was not to engage in any illegal activity until he was 
authorized to do so by his parole officer or another law 
enforcement official.  Despite these warning, Mordago quickly 
became involved in drug activity. 
            In his discussions with law enforcement officials on 
October 10, November 5, and November 7, Mordago provided 
information concerning Paz and other drug traffickers.  These 
discussions were recorded in FBI 302 reports, which were provided 
to Mordago's counsel prior to trial.  The use of these reports by 
Mordago's counsel serves as the basis for Gonzalez's contentions.  
Gonzalez claims that these reports bolstered Mordago's authorized 
 
 
informant defense while implicating Gonzalez in the conspiracy, 
thereby violating his right to a fair trial.  However, our review 
of the record indicates that Gonzalez's claim lacks merit. 
          First, Gonzalez directs our attention to Mordago's 
counsel's cross-examination of Paz.  There, counsel attempted to 
elicit from Paz whether Mordago ever informed Paz that Mordago 
had told government agents of Gonzalez's activity.19  The 
government immediately objected, asserting that defense counsel 
was attempting to establish through his questions the fact that 
Mordago actually provided the information to the government which 
was the basis of counsel's questions.  The court sustained the 
government's objection and reminded the jury that "the questions 
of lawyers do not themselves constitute evidence . . . . You 
should not assume anything from those questions because they are 
not embraced in a probative answer as to the occurrence of the 
                     
19.  Cross-examination of Paz by Mordago's counsel: 
 
 Q: And [Mordago] also did not tell you that 
he had provided information before the time 
of his arrest on a person by the name of 
Santiago Gonzalez, correct? 
 
 A: No, he didn't tell me nothing. 
 
 Q: He also didn't tell you slightly before or 
after the time of your arrest, that he 
provided information on drug dealing that 
referred to Miami? 
 
 Government: Judge, I'll object to this line 
of questioning. 
 
TT at 45 (Sept. 11, 1992; Afternoon Session). 
 
 
events assumed therein."  TT at 48 (Sept. 11, 1992; Afternoon 
Session).  Given the court's immediate curative instruction, we 
find no prejudice to Gonzalez from this attempted cross-
examination. 
          Gonzalez next asserts that the government bolstered 
Mordago's authorized informant defense to the detriment of 
Gonzalez's own defense when it offered the testimony of FBI agent 
Judith Tyler, who had talked with Mordago on October 10, 1991.  
Agent Tyler testified that Mordago told her that Paz was selling 
between twenty-eight and thirty kilograms of cocaine a week from 
a supplier in Miami.  Gonzalez asserts that since the government, 
through Paz's testimony, established Gonzalez as Paz's Miami 
connection, the jury would have presumed that Mordago was 
referring to Gonzalez when he told agent Tyler that Paz had a 
Miami supplier.  But agent Tyler did not testify that Mordago 
informed the government that Gonzalez was Paz's Miami connection.  
Moreover, there was other testimony concerning a Florida 
supplier, i.e., Oscar Fuentes.  At best, the jury could only 
infer a connection.  We do not find any undue prejudice to 
Gonzalez resulting from this testimony.20 
          Gonzalez next claims that he was prejudiced by 
statements that Mordago made to FBI agents, which statements were 
                     
20.  Gonzalez offers the same exact argument as it relates to the 
testimony of AUSA Barbara Cohan concerning the October 10, 1991, 
conversation with Mordago.  For the reasons stated in the main 
text, we do not find any undue prejudice to Gonzalez resulting 
from this testimony. 
 
 
testified to by the agents, despite the fact that Gonzalez did 
not have the opportunity to cross-examine Mordago.  Yet, the 
premise for Gonzalez's purported right to cross-examine is based 
on the assertion that Mordago inculpated Gonzalez when talking to 
law enforcement officials.  A review of the evidence suggests 
otherwise.   
          Agent Tyler testified that Mordago told her that one of 
Paz's associates, Theodore Santiago (a/k/a "Poppo"), was selling 
between 100 and 150 kilograms of cocaine a week.21  Agent Tyler 
mentioned this aspect of her conversation with Mordago several 
times during her testimony.  Each time, she stated that Mordago's 
reference was to Theodore Santiago.22  
                     
21.  Theodore Santiago was one of the twelve individuals named in 
the government's indictment, although he was not tried with these 
defendants. 
22.  Cross-examination of agent Tyler by Gonzalez-Rivera's 
counsel concerning the agent's meeting with Mordago on November 
5, 1991: 
 
 Q: Did [Mordago] not tell you that Mr. Paz 
had an associate living in Philadelphia? 
 
 A: Yes, he did. 
 
 Q: That individual was known as Santiago, right? 
 
 A: Yes. 
 
 Q: Also known as Poppo; right? 
 
 A: Yes. 
 
 Q: Did you know who Poppo was? 
 




          The government also presented the testimony of FBI 
agent Francis Thiel, who was with agent Tyler when she met with 
Mordago on November 5, 1991.  Agent Thiel's testimony confirmed 
that Mordago's references to Santiago during this conversation 
were to Theodore Santiago, not Santiago Gonzalez.23   
(..continued) 
 Q: Do you know who Theodore Santiago is? 
 
 A: No. 
 
 Q: [Mordago] told you, did he not, that Poppo 
moved between 100 and 150 kilograms of 
cocaine a week, right? 
 
 A: Yes. 
 
TT at 24-25 (Sept. 15, 1992; Morning Session). 
 
 After this cross-examination, Agent Tyler was cross-
examined by Mordago's counsel with regard to the November 5, 1991 
meeting: 
 
 Q: Do you recall Mr. Mordago saying there is 
a Colombian called Tosti T-O-S-T-I who lives 
on White Plains Road, the Bronx, New York, 
associated with the Cali Cartel? 
 
 A: Yes. 
 
 Q: Did he also mention an associate of Mr. 
Paz named Santiago also known as Poppo? 
 
 A: Yes, he did. 
 
 Q: Did he state that Poppo moves between one 
hundred to 150 kilos of cocaine per week? 
 
 A: Yes, he did. 
 
Id. at 47. 
23.  Direct examination of Agent Thiel by the government 





 Q: Now what other information did Joaquin 
Mordago provide on that date, November 5th, 
1991? 
 
 A: He mentioned that there was another 
associate of Mr. Paz by the name of Mr. 
Poppo, who was a drug dealer in Philadelphia. 
 
TT at 70 (Sept. 15, 1992; Morning Session). 
 
 Cross-examination of agent Thiel by Gonzalez-Rivera's 




 Q: [Mordago] also identified an individual 
named Santiago or Poppo who could obtain 
between 100 and 150 kilos of cocaine per 
week, correct? 
 
 A: That is correct. 
 
 Q: I heard you testify on direct examination 
you were part of this case, right? 
 
 A: Yes. 
 
 Q: You were monitoring the tapes, right? 
 
 A: Yes. 
 
 Q: Do you know an individual named Theodore 
Santiago? 
 
 A: Yes, sir. 
 
 Q: He is indicted in this case, right? 
 
 A: Yes. 
 
 Q: He has a nickname of Poppo, correct? 
 
 A: That is correct. 
 
Id. at 79-80. 
 
 
          Notwithstanding the specificity of agents Tyler's and 
Thiel's testimony, Gonzalez asserts that the jury was left with 
the impression that Mordago provided the government with 
information on him, rather than on Theodore Santiago.  In support 
of this argument, Gonzalez asserts that a telephone number which 
Mordago associated with "Poppo" and provided to agents Tyler and 
Thiel was Gonzalez's girlfriend's telephone number.24  In 
essence, Gonzalez is asserting that any reference in the agents' 
testimony to Theodore Santiago was in reality a reference to 
Santiago Gonzalez. 
            Gonzalez argues that the agents' testimony concerning 
Theodore Santiago, much of it solicited during cross-examination 
in support of Mordago's authorized informant defense, violated 
Gonzalez's right to a fair trial.  Gonzalez asserts that not only 
was he unable to cross-examine Mordago as to these statements, 
but Mordago's defense was antagonistic to Gonzalez's defense, to 
the point of being irreconcilable and mutually exclusive.  In his 
brief, Gonzalez asserts: "At the close of all the evidence, the 
jury faced a clear choice of either totally discrediting 
Mordago's claim that he had made pretrial incriminating 
statements against [Santiago Gonzalez], or rejecting out-of-hand 
                     
24.  Both Tyler and Thiel testified that Mordago had given them a 
telephone number for Theodore Santiago.  During his defense, 
Gonzalez presented Maria Soto, who testified that Gonzalez lived 
with her in Philadelphia.  Soto testified that the telephone 




[Santiago Gonzalez's] defense that he was completely innocent of 
any involvement in Paz's drug dealing."  
          Gonzalez goes on to assert that this prejudice was 
compounded by Mordago's closing argument, in which Mordago's 
counsel, as part of his client's authorized informant defense, 
pinpointed Gonzalez as one of the traffickers that Mordago 
revealed to the government.  Gonzalez's counsel did not object to 
this summation.  Rather, he now asserts that counsel's 
"communication to the jury of Mordago's incriminating statements 
against [Gonzalez] was the same as the admission of a co-
defendant's confession implicating another defendant in a joint 
trial when the codefendant does not take the stand."   
          As an initial matter, Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 
123 (1968) does not apply when an attorney for a co-defendant 
implicates the defendant during closing argument.  Sandini, 888 
F.2d at 311.  "We have . . . never held that Bruton applies when 
the attorney for a codefendant implicates a defendant during a 
closing argument and we perceive of no reason to do so because 
the arguments of counsel are simply not evidence.  Bruton is 
directed toward preserving a defendant's right to cross-
examination, and thus has nothing to do with arguments of counsel 
based on their interpretation of the evidence."  Id. at 310-11.   
          Gonzalez attempts to distinguish Sandini based on the 
proposition that there was evidence to support counsel's 
assertions that Mordago had identified Gonzalez as Paz's Miami 
 
 
drug supplier.  In essence, Gonzalez is asserting that the 
underlying evidence violated Bruton.  Thus, we examine the use of 
the FBI 302 reports to see if a Bruton violation occurred. 
          We reject Gonzalez's argument on two grounds.  First, 
the FBI 302 reports were never published to the jury.25  Second, 
Gonzalez reads too much into the testimony of agents Tyler and 
Thiel.  As previously discussed, both agents specifically 
testified that Mordago provided information on Theodore Santiago 
(a/k/a "Poppo"), not Gonzalez.  If the agents' testimony of what 
Mordago told them expressly inculpated Gonzalez, clearly there 
would be a Bruton problem and a stronger case for severance.  
However, the evidence highlighted by Gonzalez provides little 
support for reversing his conviction.   
          In addition, we do not believe that Gonzalez was 
entitled to a mistrial and severance based on our reading of 
Zafiro.  Zafiro confirms that defendants have a heavy burden in 
gaining severance.  We find that Gonzalez has failed to meet this 
burden and that the defendant was not entitled to a severance.   
          Moreover, in regard to the government informant 
defense, Mordago's defense was not mutually exclusive of 
Gonzalez's defense that he was not aware of Paz's drug dealing 
                     
25.  In fact, the district court was particularly careful in 
preventing a Bruton problem.  After summation, Mordago's counsel 
sought to have the FBI 302 reports published to the jury.  The 
court denied the motion, citing the potential prejudice to 
Gonzalez.  Thus, not only did the district court not commit plain 
error as its relates to Gonzalez's right to a fair trial, it 
sought to avoid any undue prejudice to the defendant. 
 
 
activities.  Gonzalez testified that he was not involved in Paz's 
drug trafficking and that he did not know, when he met with agent 
Tapia, why MRK owed Paz $97,500.  The jury could have believed 
that Mordago was a government informant as his testimony related 
to Theodore Santiago and other traffickers, while also finding 
that Gonzalez was not involved in any drug activity.  Thus, it 
would have been possible to acquit both Mordago and Gonzalez.  
Based on our review of the evidence at trial, we do not believe 
the defendants presented mutually exclusive defenses.   
          Moreover, the government presented a substantial amount 
of evidence in support of Gonzalez's role in trafficking cocaine.  
Gonzalez's conviction on Count Fourteen for distribution of a 
controlled substance was based on the September 13, 1991, sale of 
one kilogram of cocaine for $21,000 to agent Gonzalez, working 
undercover at MRK.  This transaction was captured on videotape 
and the tape was admitted into evidence.  Gonzalez's conviction 
on Count Sixteen for distribution of a controlled substance was 
based on the October 11, 1993, sale of five kilograms of cocaine 
to agent Gonzalez.  Paz and agent Gonzalez agreed that agent 
Gonzalez would pay $19,500 per kilogram, for a total sale of 
$97,500.  Our review of the evidence indicates that the 
government demonstrated Santiago Gonzalez's active involvement in 
this cocaine transaction.   
        In sum, we find that the district court did not commit 
error in deciding not to sever Gonzalez's trial from Mordago's.  
 
 
We further find that there was substantial evidence, exclusive of 
the October tapes to support Gonzalez's conviction.  We will, 
therefore, uphold Gonzalez's convictions on Counts One, Fourteen, 
and Sixteen.   
 iii.  Fine and Restitution 
          In addition to his term of imprisonment and supervised 
release, the district court imposed a $5,000 fine on Gonzalez and 
ordered him to pay $21,000 in restitution.  Gonzalez appeals both 
the fine and restitution, asserting that the district court erred 
in failing to make express findings as to his ability to pay.  
See United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 223 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 399 (1991).  The government concedes that no 
such express findings were made.  We will therefore remand the 
issue of the fine to the district court for it to make express 
findings regarding Gonzalez's ability to pay a fine. 
          With regard to the restitution ordered by the district 
court, the government contends that calling this sanction 
"restitution" was simply a clerical error which can be corrected 
without remand.  The jury returned a special verdict that 
Gonzalez should forfeit $20,000 based on Count Twenty-Five.  The 
government claims that the district court mistakenly ordered  
Gonzalez to pay $21,000 as restitution instead of directing the 
defendant to comply with the jury's special verdict on 
forfeiture.  The government further asserts that under Fed. R. 
Crim. Pro. 36, a clerical error in a judgment may be corrected by 
 
 
the district court at any time.  We conclude, however, that the 
scope of the error is not that clear.  We will, therefore, remand 
this issue to the district court to clarify whether or not it 
erred in denominating forfeiture as restitution and whether it 
misstated the amount of forfeiture if that is what was intended.  
If the district court intended to impose payment of restitution, 
it should also on remand make express findings as to such 
restitution. 
 D.  Melba Quintero 
          Melba Quintero was convicted of three telephone counts 
which the government concedes must be reversed (Counts Seventeen, 
Nineteen, and Twenty).  We will do so.  Quintero's remaining 
convictions are for conspiracy to distribute in excess of five 
kilograms of cocaine (Count One), distribution of cocaine (Count 
Twenty-Two), and possession with intent to distribute cocaine 
(Count Twenty-Three).  Quintero asserts that the admission of the 
October tapes was prejudicial error as to these three 
convictions.  The government maintains that the admission of the 
October tapes was harmless error based on the substantial 
evidence, excluding the October calls, against Quintero.  This 
evidence includes testimony by Paz and FBI agent Joaquin Garcia 
("Garcia"), a videotaped meeting and two telephone calls between 
Quintero and Garcia, and items seized from Quintero at the time 
of her arrest.26  
                     
26.  These items included the address of Cruz, and the home, work 
and beeper numbers for Gonzalez-Rivera. 
 
 
          Paz testified that he received two and one-half 
kilograms of cocaine on consignment from Quintero and codefendant 
Elsa Cruz during a trip to New York shortly before his arrest.  
On October 31, 1991, Paz sold two of these kilograms to agent 
Gonzalez at MRK.  This was the basis for Quintero's conviction on 
Count Twenty-Two for aiding and abetting the distribution of 
cocaine.  Under the plan developed by the FBI for Paz's arrest, 
agent Gonzalez agreed to accept two of the kilograms of cocaine 
that Paz brought that day but to refuse the remainder.  On 
leaving MRK, Paz was arrested with the remaining cocaine in his 
possession.  This was the basis for Quintero's conviction on 
Count Twenty-Three for aiding and abetting Paz in the possession 
with intent to distribute cocaine.  We find that there was 
adequate evidence, without the tapes, to support these 
convictions. 
          Turning to the conspiracy conviction, soon after Paz's 
arrest, the FBI undertook a further investigation of Quintero.  
An undercover operation was initiated in which Quintero was 
provided with agent Garcia's beeper number and told that a debt 
Garcia owed Paz would be paid to her instead.  Approximately four 
weeks after Paz's arrest, Quintero contacted Garcia.  Garcia 
testified that during their initial conversation he advised 
Quintero that he had some money that he owed Paz that he would 
give to her instead.  After several more telephone conversations, 
Garcia and Quintero agreed to meet at a hotel in Queens, New 
 
 
York, on December 10, 1991.  Garcia brought with him another 
undercover agent.  Quintero was accompanied by Elsa Cruz.          
 A videotape of the December 10 meeting was introduced 
into evidence.  At the start of the meeting Quintero introduced 
Cruz as "her partner."  Garcia asked Quintero and Cruz how much 
money Paz owed them.  They responded that they had provided Paz 
with more than two kilograms of cocaine.27  Garcia testified that 
                     
27.  The following conversation was recorded on December 10, 
1991. 
 
 Agent Garcia ("AG"): And how much money does 
Cristobal owe you two? 
 
 Elsa Cruz ("EC"): Two kilos and two thousand 
twenty-seven. 
 
 AG: Two kilos and two thousand twenty-seven? 
 
 Melba Quintero ("MQ"): No. . . . Two hundred 
twenty-seven. 
 
 AG: How is that? 
 
 EC: Yes.  It's two hundred.  Two hundred. . . 
It was two kilos and two hundred and twenty- 
seven. 
 
 AG: Two hundred twenty-seven thousand dollars? 
 
 EC: Nooo! 
 
 MQ: No. . . Two kilos. 
 
 EC: It was two kilos and two hundred and 
twenty-seven grams. 
 
 AG: Ah . . . grams. 
 
TT at 59-60 (Sept. 14, 1992; Morning Session). 
 
 
he understood from this conversation that Paz owed them money for 
this amount of cocaine.28   
          In her defense, Quintero admitted that this 
conversation was about cocaine.  She asserted, however, that this 
was a ploy that she and Elsa Cruz created in order to get back 
money which Quintero had given Paz for the purchase of a car.  
Quintero testified that any reference to cocaine during this 
meeting was an act in an effort to get Garcia to give them the 
money that he purportedly owed Paz.  During this meeting, Garcia 
gave Quintero and Cruz $2,000 as a partial payment.29  
            Quintero seeks to discount the value of the 
videotape, asserting that it "cannot stand on [its] own once Paz' 
testimony is discounted."  Our review of the transcript, however, 
convinces us that it can stand very well on its own without 
support from the October tapes.  It was up to the jury to judge 
Quintero's credibility.  We do not find it likely, in view of the 
other substantial evidence, that the jury's assessment of 
credibility was altered by the improper admission of the October 
tapes.  Not only did Paz testify to receiving two and one-half 
                     
28.  There were references throughout the forty minute meeting to 
cocaine and drug transactions.  At one point, Quintero and Cruz 
asked Garcia if he could get a copy of the police report of Paz's 
arrest from Paz's girlfriend.  Garcia testified that it is common 
for drug traffickers to show such records to their suppliers in 
an effort to be released from any debt owed on the cocaine 
seized. 
29.  This $2,000 was the basis for Quintero's conviction in Count 
Twenty-Eight for criminal forfeiture. 
 
 
kilograms of cocaine from Quintero, the jury was presented with a 
videotaped conversation in which Quintero specifies to agent 
Garcia the amount of cocaine that she delivered to Paz.  The jury 
had the opportunity to hear and evaluate Quintero's explanation 
for her statements on the videotape.  They choose not to believe 
her.   
          We find that the admission of the October tapes 
constituted harmless error and that there is sufficient evidence 
to affirm Quintero's convictions on Counts One, Twenty-Two, and 
Twenty-Three.   
 E. Joaquin Mordago 
  Joaquin Mordago was convicted of one telephone count 
which the government concedes must be reversed (Count Eighteen).  
Again, we will do so.  Mordago's remaining conviction is for 
conspiracy to distribute in excess of five kilograms of cocaine 
(Count One).  Mordago asserts a number of specific reasons why 
the admission of the October tapes constituted prejudicial error 
as to Count One.  The government contends, on the other hand, 
that the admission of the October tapes was harmless error based 
on the other evidence against Mordago.  This evidence included 
testimony by Paz, a videotape in which Paz was recorded talking 
with someone, purported to be Mordago, about the quality of 
certain cocaine, and items seized from Mordago at the time of his 
arrest.30 
                     
30.  These items included the beeper numbers for Paz and 
Gonzalez-Rivera, and the telephone number of Gonzalez. 
 
 
          Mordago's role in the conspiracy involved his drying 
two and one half kilograms of "wet" cocaine which Paz received 
from Quintero and Cruz.  Paz testified that Mordago helped him 
dry the cocaine by mixing it with acetone.  According to Paz, 
Mordago had attempted to sell the three kilograms of cocaine but 
returned them to Paz when Paz believed that he had a willing 
buyer in agent Gonzalez at MRK.  Paz stated that during the 
October 31 transaction at MRK, he called Mordago to complain 
about the quality of the cocaine.  Paz's part of this 
conversation was recorded on the videotape, which was played for 
the jury.31  There is no evidence, independent of Paz's 
                     
31.  The following is testimony by Paz on direct examination by 
the government. 
 
 Q: Now, during this part of the videotape, 
where are you seated? 
 
 A: Behind a desk. 
 
 Q: What were you doing? 
 
 A: I was making a telephone call. 
 
 Q: Who were you calling? 
 
 A: Joaquin Mordago. 
 
 Q: What were you saying to Joaquin Mordago? 
 
 A: That I was having problems with that kilo, 
that what he had done was some shit. 
 
 Q: Now looking at the top of page six of the 
transcript book, you stated towards the top 
of that page the following:  There is one 
that you made for me there, that doesn't even 
have a shape.  It doesn't even have shape.  
 
 
testimony, of the identity of the person to whom he was talking 
during this conversation. 
          In addition to Counts One and Eighteen, Mordago was 
indicted on Count Sixteen for distribution of cocaine.  The jury 
acquitted him on this count.  Count Sixteen was based on the 
October 11, 1993, sale of five kilograms of cocaine to agent 
Gonzalez by Paz and Santiago Gonzalez.  The government's evidence 
tying Mordago to the distribution of this cocaine was testimony 
by an FBI agent who on November 8, 1991, arrested Mordago in the 
Comfort Inn hotel room registered to Gonzalez, twenty minutes 
after Gonzalez was arrested in the parking lot.   
(..continued) 
No, but we have to do that again.  Now, what 
were you referring to in that part of the 
conversation that it didn't have shape? 
 
 A: The kilo that [agent Gonzalez] did not 
want. 
 
 Q: When you stated "but we have to do that 
again man," what had to be done again? 
 
 A: That kilo that didn't have shape. 
 
 Q: What was going to be done to give that kilo shape? 
 
 A: Again, to take it, melt it, put it in a 
vase, I don't know what the man was going to 
do. 
 
 Q: That man was going to do, who were you 
referring to? 
 
 A: Joaquin Mordago. 
 
TT at 42-43 (Sept. 3, 1992; Morning Session). 
 
 
          The defense asserted that Mordago was present in 
Gonzalez's hotel room as part of his efforts to provide 
information to the government.  The government presented several 
law enforcement officials who testified that Mordago had not been 
authorized to act in such a manner.  We can only hypothesize why 
the jury acquitted Mordago on Count Sixteen.  Mordago asserts 
that the jury "apparently accepted" his authorized informant 
defense as it related to Count Sixteen.  Equally plausible, 
however, is that the jury believed that the evidence against 
Mordago, arrested while waiting in Gonzalez's hotel room, was 
insufficient to find that he participated in the distribution of 
the five kilograms of cocaine to MRK.  Given the fact the 
government presented no evidence that Mordago supplied, 
delivered, or sought direct payment for the five kilograms which 
were given to agent Gonzalez on consignment, it is quite possible 
that the jury did not believe the government had proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt Mordago's participation in the distribution. 
          The jury was presented with evidence of four taped 
phone conversations between Paz and Mordago during the month of 
October, one on October 12, two on October 17, and one on October 
23.  Agent Clouse testified that during the October 12 telephone 
conversation, Mordago offered to supply Paz with a device that 
Paz could use to detect wire taps and scramble telephone 
conversations to avoid being intercepted.   
 
 
          Paz testified about the contents of all four October 
telephone conversations.  In each instance, the conversation was 
played for the jury, followed by Paz's testimony.  During the 
October 12 telephone conversation, Mordago told Paz that "I'm in 
a pretty bad situation and I want to start doing something, do 
you understand it?"  Paz testified that he interpreted this to 
mean that Mordago wanted to become involved in cocaine 
trafficking.  Paz also testified, based on this conversation, 
that Mordago had an interest in meeting with Gonzalez-Rivera.  
During the October 23 telephone conversation, Mordago asked Paz 
"why don't you talk to Papo so that he get me" and later told Paz 
that "I want to start working brother."  Paz testified that he 
understood Mordago to mean that he wanted Paz to find him some 
cocaine so that he could start selling it.32 
          Without these taped recordings, the only evidence 
presented by the government of Mordago's role in the conspiracy 
was Paz's testimony and the facts surrounding Mordago's arrest.  
                     
32.  This conversation also contained a statement by Mordago that 
"Alfredo is going to bring to me . . . to fix the blender . . . 
you brought me yesterday."  Paz testified this was a reference to 
the drying and mixing of the two and one-half kilograms of 
cocaine received from Quintero and Elsa Cruz.  On cross-
examination, however, Paz testified that the reference may have 
been to bullets for a gun that he claimed to have given Mordago.  
Paz's testimony on this aspect of the recorded conversation is 
ambiguous.  Nevertheless, the government sought to prove that 
Mordago assisted Paz by drying the cocaine received from Quintero 
and Elsa Cruz.  The government introduced into evidence a 
telephone conversation between Paz and Gonzalez recorded on 
October 28 in which Paz told Gonzalez that "Joaquin" had dried 
some cocaine for him.  This conversation was also inadmissible. 
 
 
Mordago asserts that Paz "had an overwhelming motive and bias 
against Mordago" based on the fact that Mordago had supplied 
information to the government on Paz's drug trafficking activity 
three weeks prior to Paz's arrest.  On October 10, 1991, Mordago 
informed AUSA Cohan and agent Tyler during a telephone 
conversation that Paz was distributing between twenty-eight and 
thirty kilograms of cocaine per week. 
          AUSA Cohan and agent Tyler talked with Mordago by 
telephone on October 10, 1991, one week after his release from 
prison.  AUSA Cohan testified that she recalled that Mordago told 
them that he had met Paz at a restaurant called El Kibuk and 
learned that Paz was distributing between twenty-eight and thirty 
kilograms of cocaine per week.  Agent Tyler testified that during 
this October 10 telephone conversation, Mordago "advised me that 
he had met, had been to El Kibuk, and had learned that a guy 
named Cristobal Paz was selling 28 to 30 kilos of cocaine from a 
supplier in Miami."  TT at 15 (Sept. 15, 1992; Morning Session). 
          Mordago's theory, if credible, gives Paz a motive to 
implicate Mordago in the conspiracy in retaliation for Mordago's 
role in providing the government with information concerning 
Paz's drug related activity.  Moreover, the only substantive 
evidence establishing Mordago's role in the conspiracy outside of 
the October tapes is Paz's testimony.  Unlike the other 
defendants recorded on the October tapes, for whom there was 
independent evidence beyond Paz's testimony to prove their active 
 
 
role in the conspiracy, no such independent admissible evidence 
was introduced by the government with regard to Mordago.   
 The government responds that Mordago's arrest on 
November 8 in Gonzalez's Comfort Inn hotel room was evidence of 
his role in the conspiracy.  However, Mordago's presence in the 
hotel room did not seem that culpable to the jury.  They 
acquitted Mordago on Count Sixteen.  The only other evidence 
brought to our attention of Mordago's involvement in the 
conspiracy was his possession of Gonzalez-Rivera's beeper number 
at the time of his arrest.   
 In a trial without the October tapes, Paz's testimony, 
with appropriate cross-examination, might be enough to support a 
finding that Mordago participated in the conspiracy.  Here, 
however, the admission of the October tapes clearly disadvantaged 
Mordago to a greater degree that it did his co-defendants.  Based 
on this analysis, we do not have a sure conviction that the 
admission of the October tapes did not prejudice him.   
          We do not reach this conclusion on the basis that 
Mordago should have been acquitted based on his authorized 
informant defense.33  Rather, we only find that the admission of 
                     
33.  In crediting the information Mordago supplied to the 
government on October 10, we in no way comment on the sufficiency 
of Mordago's authorized informant defense.  That will be for a 
new jury to decide if the government seeks to retry the 
defendant.  It is entirely possible that the jury believed, as 
the government argued, that Mordago was not authorized to engage 
in the illegal activity that the government sought to prove he 
engaged in.  We only note the information that Mordago  provided 
to the government on October 10 as it impacts on the credibility 
of Paz's testimony.   
 
 
the October tapes constituted prejudicial error to defendant 
Mordago.  We will therefore reverse Mordago's conviction on Count 
One. 
 V. Jose Cruz 
          Cruz is not recorded on any telephone call offered into 
evidence by the government.  Rather, he challenges the district 
court's refusal to suppress evidence of fifteen kilograms of 
cocaine found in his car during a search by the New Jersey State 
police.  Cruz asserts that the search of a suitcase in the trunk 
of the car he was driving constituted an illegal search and 
seizure, which should have resulted in the evidence obtained 
being suppressed.  A review of the facts culminating the search 
indicates that no constitutional violation occurred and the 
district court did not err in admitting the evidence obtained.   
We therefore will affirm Cruz's conviction on Counts One and 
Five. 
 VI. 
          For the reasons stated above, we will affirm Gonzalez-
Rivera's convictions on Counts One, Two, Five, Six, and Eight,  
Rodriguez's convictions on Count One and Thirteen, Gonzalez's 
convictions on Counts One, Fourteen and Sixteen, Quintero's 
convictions on Counts One, Twenty-Two, and Twenty-Three, and 
Cruz's conviction on Counts One and Five.  We will reverse 
Gonzalez's convictions on Count Twenty-One, and Quintero's 
convictions on Counts Seventeen, Nineteen, and Twenty.  We will 
 
 
reverse Mordago's convictions on Counts One and Eighteen and 
remand Count One against Mordago to the district court for a new 
trial.  We will reverse and remand for further proceedings the 
fine and restitution imposed on Gonzalez. 
 Defendants Gonzalez and Quintero will have to be 
resentenced because of the reversal of certain of their 
convictions.  The government concedes that the suppression of the 
October tapes will also require that defendants Gonzalez-Rivera, 
Rodriguez, and Cruz be resentenced because in calculating their 
original sentences the district judge may have attached 
significance to one or more of the October tapes.34  Therefore, 
we will remand for resentencing defendants Gonzalez, Quintero, 
Gonzalez-Rivera, Rodriguez and Cruz. 
 
 
                     
 
34.  The government mades this concession in its letter of March 
31, 1994:  
 Re-sentencing for all six defendants would be 
necessary because within a given guideline 
range, the district court has wide 
discretion.  Since the judge, in his 
discretion, could have attached considerable 
significance to one or more of the October 
tapes, re-sentencing would be appropriate to 
allow the judge to re-weigh all of the 
various factors which ultimately contribute 
to a particular sentence. 
 
